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INTRODUCTION1

The police pulled up to the Oregon nursing home with a search warrant
signed by a county judge. Their suspect: a bed-ridden, 73-year-old man who also
might be the elusive Golden State Killer who murdered 13 women and raped
dozens more in the 1970s and 1980s. Without getting a warrant, law enforcement
officers had narrowed their search for the killer using a public genealogy website
with DNA2 test results uploaded by hundreds of thousands of people. Their final
clue had been that this suspect—along with the Killer—had a genetic mutation

1

This introduction is drawn from DNA Used in Hunt for Golden State Killer Previously Led
to Wrong Man, NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2018, 3:45 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/dna-used-hunt-golden-state-killer-previously-led-wrong-man-n869796; and Benjamin
Oreskes, et al., False Starts in Search for Golden State Killer Reveal the Pitfalls of DNA Testing,
L.A. TIMES (May 4, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-golden-state-killerdna-20180504-story.html.
2
“DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is the genetic material found in the nucleus of cells, and
is often referred to as the ‘blueprint of life.’ . . . The bases or components of DNA are four
chemicals: Cytosine, Guanine, Thymine, Adenine.” Jules Epstein, “Genetic Surveillance”—The
Bogeyman Response to Familial DNA Investigations, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 141, 143
(2009).
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possessed by less than 3% of Caucasians in the genealogy database. Without
asking the man’s permission as he lay in bed, the police swabbed a DNA sample
from his mouth and sent it for lab testing, comparing it to the DNA of the Golden
State Killer found at a crime scene decades earlier. The result: no match; the man
was innocent. The police tested a second suspect—also no match. Finally, on the
third try, they got their man: Joseph De Angelo, an ex-cop now facing rape and
murder charges and whose DNA matched the real killer.
This story of mistaken identity, breath-taking DNA testing technology,
and hard-boiled police work has become the first chapter in a series of
increasingly common criminal investigations that rely on genetic samples tested
by genealogy companies such as 23andMe and Ancestry, two of the most popular
services, and loaded on public websites such as Ysearch or GEDmatch, the site
that led police to the Golden State Killer.3 Law enforcement officers all over the
United States are now using similar tactics in hundreds of cases to catch alleged
killers and have logged their first jury verdict conviction in one such case in
2019.4 While some commercial genealogy sites, like Ancestry and 23andMe,
have a policy that requires a warrant from the police before disclosing genetic
data, sites like GEDmatch have less stringent policies.
But some privacy advocates believe warrantless searches of DNA
databases could violate the Fourth Amendment and other privacy interests and
lead to police abuses. They suggest the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision,
Carpenter v. United States,5 provides a constitutional basis for ending these law
enforcement tactics.6

3
Companies such as Parabon NanoLabs now work with police and GEDmatch to load DNA
from hundreds of cases. See Sarah Zhang, How a Tiny Website Became the Police’s Go-To
Genealogy
Database,
ATLANTIC
(June
1,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/gedmatch-police-genealogydatabase/561695/.
4
Hundreds of cases are now investigated using DNA evidence. See Heather Murphy, How
Your
DNA
Could
Solve
a
Murder,
WEEK
(June
27,
2018),
https://theweek.com/articles/841864/how-dna-could-solve-murder. In June 2019, a jury convicted
William Talbott II of two 1987 murders based on DNA evidence—the first verdict in such a case.
See Robert Gearty, Washington Cold Case Solved Using DNA and Genetic Genealogy Results in
Landmark Verdict, FOX NEWS (June 29, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/us/cold-case-solveddna-genetic-genealogy-landmark-verdict.
5

138 S. Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018).
See Ken Strutin, DNA Without Warrant: Decoding Privacy, Probable Cause and
Personhood, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 319, 364 (2015) (“[W]hen technology advances to
efficiently collect and catalog shed DNA, biological tracking data, another kind of privacy interest
might be recognized.”); see also Rebecca Lund, It Is All in the Family: Using Online DNA Profiles
to
Identify
Suspects,
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
(Oct.
21,
2018),
http://www.jetlaw.org/2018/10/21/it-is-all-in-the-family-using-online-dna-profiles-to-identifysuspects/ (“Should police be permitted to create fake profiles and upload [DNA] data without prior
authorization? In the wake of [Carpenter] . . . many are left wondering whether this will continue
to be permitted.”).
6
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Part II of this Article briefly examines the Carpenter decision and the
privacy interests implicated by DNA testing and private genealogy websites. Part
III discusses whether, after Carpenter, police searches of genealogy websites
trigger Fourth Amendment protection. Part IV explores the third-party doctrine,
assessing its post-Carpenter viability in the DNA context. Concluding the Fourth
Amendment provides limited protection, Part V seeks alternative solutions to the
noted privacy concerns.
II. CARPENTER, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, AND DNA TESTING
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”7 In the context of DNA testing, the term “persons” includes bodily
fluids and DNA.8 When analyzing a search issue, courts first ask whether the
item searched by police (e.g., a DNA test in a private database) is protected by
the Fourth Amendment.9 If so, courts then determine whether the search was
reasonable.10 The Supreme Court’s “basic rule” is that “‘searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”11
This Article explores the issue of warrantless police searches of private
genealogy databases after Carpenter, focusing on whether the Fourth
Amendment protects DNA test results—both a person’s own results and those of
their biological relatives—and whether the “third-party doctrine”12 is viable in
that context. If the Fourth Amendment applies, this Article assumes without
discussion that any warrantless search would be per se unreasonable (i.e., a
constitutional violation).
This part of the Article briefly recounts basic Fourth Amendment
principles: the historical property-based approach, the modern method based on
“reasonable expectations of privacy,” and the development of the third-party
doctrine. Next, it examines the Carpenter decision and its potential impact on

7

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects,
104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 808–09 (2016).
9
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967).
8

10
11

See id.
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357).

The third-party doctrine essentially holds that, “when a person voluntarily gives information
to a third party, even for a limited, specific purpose, and that third party delivers the information
to law enforcement, the government’s acquisition of the information cannot be defined as a search.”
Laurie Buchan Serafino, “I Know My Rights, So You Go’n Need a Warrant for That”: The Fourth
Amendment, Riley’s Impact, and Warrantless Searches of Third-Party Clouds, 19 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 154, 166 (2014).
12
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Fourth Amendment law. Finally, it explores privacy interests associated with
DNA testing and the storage of test results in both government-controlled and
private genealogy databases and websites.
A. Historical Fourth Amendment Analysis and the Carpenter Decision
In Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court found that the police
conducted a search under the Fourth Amendment when they accessed
third-party, historical records of a suspect’s cell-phone location.13 In its decision,
the Court deepened privacy protections for cell-phone usage and refused to apply
the third-party doctrine to negate those protections. It recounted the two
“guideposts” of the Fourth Amendment: (1) securing “the privacies of life”
against “arbitrary power,” and (2) placing “obstacles in the way of a too
permeating police surveillance.”14
Privacy advocates would like to conscript these guideposts into service
to protect information on genealogy sites from the police. Seeing Carpenter as a
“landmark ruling on how to apply the Fourth Amendment’s protections in the
digital world,” they envision its application to genealogy databases, which
“contain a wealth of deeply personal information about one’s ancestry and
medical conditions.”15 They contend the current “division between privacy in
information technology and in information biologics does not further the ends of
justice” and they ask why the cell phone should receive more constitutional
protections than the contents of the human body.16
1. The Dual Track of the Fourth Amendment
The trajectory of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has followed two
tracks. Traditionally, it had been “tied to common-law trespass” and focused on
whether the Government “obtains information by physically intruding on a
constitutionally protected area.”17 This common-law property sentiment was best
represented by Entick v. Carrington,18 a well-known English case in which Lord
Camden stated that the law “holds the property of every man so sacred, that no
man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave; if he does he

13

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).

14

Id. at 2214 (citations omitted).
Matt Ford, How the Supreme Court Could Rewrite the Rules for DNA Searches, NEW
REPUBLIC (Apr. 30, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/148170/supreme-court-rewrite-rulesdna-searches.
15

16

Strutin, supra note 6, at 366.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (citations omitted) (discussing Fourth Amendment
precedents).
18
Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (KB).
17
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is a trespasser, though he does no damage.”19 For over a century, the Court relied
on this property-based approach when interpreting the Fourth Amendment,
finding a search occurs when police trespass on a property interest. It followed
this first track in earlier cases, such as Olmstead v. United States,20 and again
very recently in Florida v. Jardines21 and United States v. Jones,22 where the
Court emphasized the continued viability of the property-based approach today.
Then, in the 1960s, the Supreme Court “recognized that ‘property rights
are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations.’”23 The landmark case
of Katz v. United States24 created a second track, finding that the Fourth
Amendment “‘protects people, not places,’ and expanded [the] conception of the
Amendment to protect certain expectations of privacy as well.”25 Today, not all
Justices agree the Katz test is valid,26 and some have complained that it leads to
inconsistent and nonsensical results.27 But, as Carpenter explained, Katz held
that “[w]hen an individual ‘seeks to preserve something as private,’ and his
expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,’
we have held that official intrusion into that private sphere generally qualifies as
a search and requires a warrant supported by probable cause.”28

19

Id. at 817.
277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (finding no Fourth Amendment search when government agents
tapped phone wires on the public streets due to a lack of trespass in “the houses or offices of the
defendants”); see also Peter C. Ormerod & Lawrence J. Trautman, A Descriptive Analysis of the
Fourth Amendment and the Third-Party Doctrine in the Digital Age, 28 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 73,
79 (2018) (discussing Olmstead).
20

21
569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013) (finding a Fourth Amendment search when police trespassed with
drug-sniffing dogs on curtilage of home); see also Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 20, at 79
(discussing Jardines).
22
565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (finding a Fourth Amendment search when police trespassed on
a private vehicle to place a GPS tracker); see also Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 20, at 79
(discussing Jones).
23

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (discussing modern Fourth Amendment cases).
389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (finding a Fourth Amendment search when agents placed a
listening device on a public telephone booth due to Katz’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”).
25
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213.
24

26
Id. at 2239 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing Katz “strays” far from the constitutional text
“by focusing on the concept of ‘privacy,’” which is nowhere in the Constitution, and contending
the Founders understood “liberty and privacy rights” “in terms of property rights”).
27
Id. at 2263 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Gorsuch derided results like Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445 (1989), which says a “police helicopter hovering 400 feet above a person’s property
invades no reasonable expectation of privacy. Try that one out on your neighbors.” Carpenter, 138
S. Ct. at 2266. Just Gorsuch also questioned California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), which
holds that a “person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the garbage he puts out for
collection,” and he expressed doubt “that most people spotting a neighbor rummaging through their
garbage would think they lacked reasonable grounds to confront the rummager.” Carpenter, 138
S. Ct. at 2266.
28
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (majority opinion).
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The new Katz analysis grew over time, but not without difficulties. This
led the Supreme Court to develop the third-party doctrine in United States v.
Miller29 and Smith v. Maryland30 to explain why a Fourth Amendment search
under Katz does not occur when a suspect entrusts private information to a third
party, who then betrays the suspect to the police.31 With its origin in cases
involving confidential informants, the doctrine espouses the general rule that “if
information is possessed or known by third parties, then, for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, an individual lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the information.”32
As the new millennium dawned, the Supreme Court began to recognize
that quickly evolving advances in technology might require a sea change in its
dual-track Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In 2001, Justice Antonin Scalia
charted an initial course to deal with emerging technologies in Kyllo v. United
States.33 As the Carpenter Court explained, Kyllo rejected a “mechanical
interpretation” of the Fourth Amendment in holding that a thermal imager could
not be used by police to detect heat radiating from a suspect’s home.34 “Because
any other conclusion would leave homeowners ‘at the mercy of advancing
technology,’ [the Court] determined that the Government—absent a warrant—
could not capitalize on such new sense-enhancing technology to explore what
was happening within the home.”35
A decade later, Justice Sonia Sotomayor argued in Jones that the digital
age made it necessary to revisit “the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties”
because “people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”36 She contended the Fourth
Amendment should not “treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.”37
Two years later, in Riley v. California,38 Chief Justice John Roberts
delivered the first of two blockbuster cell-phone decisions. Recognizing the

29

425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).

30

442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
See id. (finding no Fourth Amendment search when police used a pen register because Smith
assumed the risk when he conveyed dialed numbers to the third-party phone company); Miller,
425 U.S. at 443 (establishing the “third-party doctrine” and finding no Fourth Amendment search
when police subpoenaed Miller’s banks records, including months of canceled checks).
32
Ormerod & Trautman, supra note 20, at 111.
31

33

533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (finding a Fourth Amendment search where police used a thermal
imaging device to intrude on the private areas of a home).
34
35
36
37

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214.
Id.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 418.

38
573 U.S. 373 (2014) (finding a Fourth Amendment search when police automatically
conducted a search of the contents of an arrestee’s cell phone).
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“immense storage” of sensitive information on cell phones, the Riley Court
unanimously ruled that law enforcement must obtain a Fourth Amendment
warrant to obtain a cell phone’s contents as part of a search incident to a lawful
arrest.39 Then, four years later, Chief Justice Roberts gave an even more decisive,
though more controversial, ruling on the matter of cell-phone privacy in
Carpenter.
2. The Carpenter Decision and Its Potential Impact on Police Action
In Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts (joined by the Court’s four “liberal”
members) expanded privacy rights and held that law enforcement conducts a
search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical cell-site location
information (“CSLI”), which provides a “comprehensive chronicle of the user’s
past movements.”40 Significantly, the Court re-interpreted its traditional
understanding of a person’s privacy in their physical movements in light of
advances in technology.
Timothy Carpenter and his accomplices (along with their cell phones)
robbed nine retail stores in Michigan and Ohio over a four-month period.41 Using
court orders under the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”)42—which does not
require probable cause under the Fourth Amendment—the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) obtained business records from two wireless commercial
carriers, disclosing CSLI for Carpenter’s phone.43 Using this data (over 12,000
cell location points), the FBI retraced Carpenter’s movements over those four
months, corroborating other evidence and placing him near the scenes of the
charged robberies.44
In holding the FBI conducted a Fourth Amendment search, the Court
observed that the collection of third-party CSLI data intersected two lines of
cases: (1) that stemming from United States v. Knotts45 and United States v.

39

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (citations omitted) (discussing Riley).
Cell-site location information (“CSLI”) is continuously gathered as a cell phone
automatically connects to a cell-site radio antenna and “generates a time-stamped record.” Id. at
2211.
40

41

Id. at 2212.
The SCA requires only that police provide a court with “specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the records sought “are relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (West 2019).
42

43

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
Id. at 2212–13. Interestingly, Carpenter based its ruling on the “more sophisticated
systems . . . already in use or in development” in 2018, rather than limiting its view to the
technological facts of the case in 2011. Id. at 2218–19 (citations omitted).
44

45

460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). Carpenter explained that Knotts approved police use of a beeper
planted in a container (prior to purchase by Knotts) that “augmented” police visual surveillance
(by ground and air) “to aid in tracking a vehicle through traffic” from Minneapolis “to Knotts’s
cabin in Wisconsin, relying on the beeper’s signal to help keep the vehicle in view.” Carpenter,
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Jones,46 which address “a person’s expectation of privacy in his physical location
and movements,” and (2) that stemming from the third-party doctrine created in
United States v. Miller47 and Smith v. Maryland.48 The Court concluded the
warrantless police request for Carpenter’s CSLI violated his “reasonable
expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical movements.”49
Chief Justice Roberts explained that CSLI allows for “near perfect
surveillance” (like an “ankle monitor”) and that cell phones track their owners’
movements “nearly exactly” because people “compulsively carry cell phones
with them all the time . . . into private residences, doctor’s offices, political
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.”50 Further, the
“retrospective quality” of CSLI allows police to “travel back in time” for five
years (the current data-retention policy of wireless carriers) and analyze data
about a person who was not previously a suspect, retracing his whereabouts
“every moment of every day.”51 For reasons discussed later, the Court also found
the third-party doctrine should not be extended to this new technological area.52
The Carpenter Court’s willingness to expand modern privacy rights
while limiting the third-party doctrine has far-reaching implications. It is fair to
consider whether the Court would take a similar approach in requiring the police
to obtain a Fourth Amendment warrant before accessing DNA data on genealogy

138 S. Ct. at 2215. This was not a Fourth Amendment search “because ‘[a] person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
from one place to another,’” and “the movements of the vehicle and its final destination had been
‘voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look.’” Id. (citations omitted). The Court noted
that Knotts had “reserved the question whether ‘different constitutional principles may be
applicable’ if ‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country [were] possible.’” Id. at
2215 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284).
46
565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012). Carpenter explained that Jones invalidated a search by FBI
agents who “installed a GPS tracking device on Jones’s vehicle and remotely monitored the
vehicle’s movements for 28 days” because the police had physically trespassed on the vehicle to
place the tracker. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215. Five Justices had also “agreed that related privacy
concerns would be raised by, for example, ‘surreptitiously activating a stolen vehicle detection
system’ in Jones’s car to track Jones himself, or conducting GPS tracking of his cell phone”
because this type of monitoring “tracks ‘every movement’ a person makes” and “that ‘longer term
GPS monitoring . . . impinges on expectations of privacy’—regardless whether those movements
were disclosed to the public at large.” Id. at 2215 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 415, 426, 428
(concurring opinions of Alito & Sotomayor, JJ., respectively)).
47
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
48
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215–16 (explaining United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)
(no search of third-party bank records) and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no search of
third-party phone numbers)).
49
Id. at 2219.
50
51

Id. at 2218.
Id.

52
The Carpenter Court’s analysis of the third-party doctrine will be discussed below. See infra
Part IV.
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web sites.53 Taking into account the two “guideposts” of the Fourth Amendment,
one could argue the Constitution should secure “the privacies of life” contained
in one’s DNA from arbitrary police searches and place “obstacles” in the way of
these searches that could permeate too far into an individual’s heritage and health
data.54 Even Justice Neil Gorsuch, in dissent in Carpenter, recognized the
concern in DNA cases: “Can the government . . . secure your DNA from
23andMe without a warrant or probable cause? Smith and Miller say yes it can—
at least without running afoul of Katz. But that result strikes most lawyers and
judges today—me included—as pretty unlikely.”55
Just as Carpenter reinterpreted the idea of privacy in physical
movements, advocates hope the Supreme Court will broaden its understanding
of privacy interests involving DNA. And just as Carpenter was willing to limit
the third-party doctrine as applied to cell-phone technology, they hope the Court
will similarly limit that doctrine based on advances in DNA testing and the
ubiquity of “voluntary” genealogy tests in modern society. As one scholar
argues, DNA is “the ‘object’ or container in which privacy inheres, not merely
the data or contents,” and both computers and “nuclear DNA contain more
information than will be found in the home or ever could be. Thus, if the
expectations of millions can define the privacy interest in cell phones, certainly
the expectations of billions should decide the level of privacy in the human
genome.”56
B. Understanding Genetic Privacy and Genealogy Databases
Before applying a post-Carpenter Fourth Amendment analysis to DNA
testing and genealogy websites, it is necessary to consider the biological
processes at work and the spectrum of DNA-related privacy interests being
claimed. This section provides basic information about DNA testing and
proposes a model to form a common frame of reference when discussing the
level of privacy associated with DNA test results.
1. The Promise of DNA and Its Analysis
As living organisms, human beings possess a complete set of genetic
material—a genome—that dictates how they will grow, develop, and reproduce.
Within the nucleus of each of the trillions of cells within human beings is a
molecule of genetic material known as DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid. It is
inherited equally from a person’s mother and father, carries critical genetic
information, and is packaged in “divided bunches” on 23 paired, “thread-like
53
54
55
56

See Ford, supra note 15.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
Id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Strutin, supra note 6, at 363.
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structures called chromosomes.”57 These paired chromosomes (one from mom
and one from dad) contain two copies of each “gene,” which is a segment of
DNA containing “coding sequences that determine what the gene does (e.g.,
trigger premature gray hair), and non-coding sequences that determine when the
gene is expressed (e.g., at age 20).”58 Variants of each gene, known as “alleles,”
“occupy fixed positions (called a locus for one, loci for two or more) on a specific
chromosome.”59 The allele holds the key to DNA identification analysis.
During the last century, as scientists worked to “sequence” the human
genome, they discovered that the “vast majority of DNA—over 99.7 percent—
is identical between two people.”60 But allele variations along the DNA strand,
especially on 13 specific loci, allow scientists to “obtain [26] discrete
measurements that help individuate one person from another.”61 These loci, in
regions of DNA with no known coding function—“junk DNA”62—are now at
the core of forensic DNA analysis.
Forensic DNA analysis “identifies the alleles at each of the 13 loci,
determines the frequency with which the combination at a single locus occurs
across the population, and then calculates a ‘random-match probability,’” which
is defined as “the probability that a person other than the suspect, randomly
selected from the population, will have this profile.”63 Allele analysis not only
helps identify specific individuals, but also a person’s biological relatives.
“Because these [26] alleles are directly inherited from one’s biological parents,
there is a significant probability that two people who share biological ties will
also share a large number of alleles in common.”64
The “advent of DNA technology” and forensic DNA testing based on
allele analysis has been hailed by the Supreme Court as one of the “most
significant scientific advancements of our era.”65 The Court has acknowledged
the “undisputed utility” of DNA testing in the criminal justice system, noting its
“unparalleled ability” to exonerate the wrongly convicted and “identify the
guilty. It has the potential to significantly improve both the criminal justice

57
Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV.
291, 294–95 (2010); Genetics Home Reference, What Is a Chromosome?, NAT’L INST. HEALTH
(Aug. 20, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/basics/chromosome.
58

Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale Based on
Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 7–8 (2010).
59
60

Id. at 8.
Murphy, supra note 57, at 294–95.

61

Id.
Gabel, supra note 58, at 8–9; see also Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 445 (2013)
(discussing “junk DNA”).
63
Epstein, supra note 2, at 143–44.
62

64
65

Murphy, supra note 57, at 295.
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system and police investigative practices.”66 And its uses go beyond criminal
justice. More recently, this same impetus has driven a lucrative private,
commercial genealogy market for individuals seeking to learn more about their
own heritage and to connect with biological relatives around the world.67
2. CODIS, NDIS, and Government-Run DNA Databases
A key part of the success of forensic DNA testing has been the
development of a government-run database used to identify perpetrators of
serious criminal acts. That effort began in earnest in 1990 with the creation of
the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”)—software developed by the FBI
to help navigate DNA databases at state and local crime labs.68 In 1994, Congress
sanctioned CODIS with the DNA Identification Act, which also authorized the
FBI to create a National DNA Index System (“NDIS”), a national database that
also links with state and local crime labs.69 CODIS helps law enforcement test
unknown DNA samples gathered from crime scenes against DNA results
gathered from known criminals.70 As Justice Scalia explained, “[T]he CODIS
system works by checking to see whether any of the [DNA] samples in the
Unsolved Crimes Collection match any of the samples in the Convict and
Arrestee Collection.”71
CODIS has become “one of the largest genetic surveillance tools in the
world,” with “DNA profiles from over 14.3 million known individuals and from
over 625,000 crime scene samples,” and “has survived every legal challenge.”72
The number of samples collected has grown in the wake of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s 2013 decision approving state laws that allow for the collection of DNA
from certain arrestees.73 Now, over half of the states allow for DNA
“test-on-arrest” with “varying standards and procedures in terms of qualifying
66

Id.
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See infra Section II.B.3.
Gabel, supra note 58, at 13–14; see also Thomas Hale-Kupiec, Immortal Invasive
Initiatives? The Need for a Genetic “Right to be Forgotten”, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 441 (2016)
(discussing the history of CODIS).
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69

Gabel, supra note 58, at 14.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “CODIS sets uniform national standards for DNA
matching and then facilitates connections between local law enforcement agencies who can share
more specific information about matched STR profiles.” King, 569 U.S. at 445. The Court
expressed its understanding that “the information in the database is only useful for human identity
testing” and that DNA “information is recorded only as a ‘string of numbers.’” Id.
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Id. at 473 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Jason Kreag, Going Local: The Fragmentation of Genetic Surveillance, 95 B.U. L. REV.
1491, 1494 (2015).
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See King, 569 U.S. at 465–66. That decision will be discussed below in Part III; see also
Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV.
541, 551 (2016) (“DNA collection is now an accepted part of being arrested.”).
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offenses, timing for taking a sample, conditions for destroying samples, and their
use in court proceedings.”74 This growing database not only makes it easier to
find exact matches, but it also assists with “familial searching” for a relative of a
criminal perpetrator.75 Studies have shown that, if “the search threshold is set
widely enough, it is 80 to 90 percent likely that a partial match search will include
the relative in its results.”76
CODIS is governed by strict standards and does not formally interface
with databases that record criminal histories.77 Thus, some law enforcement
agencies continue to create local DNA databases that provide more search
flexibility with less regulation.78 These local databases often contain more
private information than found in CODIS and are sometimes funded by for-profit
enterprises.79
3. Private DNA Databases and Genealogy Websites
While CODIS and NDIS fought off legal attacks and became more
efficient means for police to locate perpetrators, the private sector
commercialized DNA testing to cater to the booming genealogy industry. The
availability of cheap, easy, online genealogy websites fed the natural human
desire to get in touch with one’s roots. With genealogy becoming “the second
most popular hobby in the U.S. after gardening,” websites dealing with
genealogy became “the second most visited category of websites, after
pornography.80 It’s a billion-dollar industry that has spawned profitable websites,
television shows, scores of books and—with the advent of over-the-counter
genetic test kits—a cottage industry in DNA ancestry testing.”81
The most popular of these commercial genealogy DNA services are
23andMe and Ancestry. Already, those two companies alone have tested and
databased well over ten million DNA samples, with the number of customers
more than doubling in 2017.82 Because these genealogy-related DNA services
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Strutin, supra note 6, at 346.
Murphy, supra note 57, at 297–98.
Id. at 298.
See Hale-Kupiec, supra note 68, at 470–71.
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Kreag, supra note 72, at 1494 n.14.
Id. at 1497 (explaining local databases “often include genetic profiles” and are easier to
access because “local agencies are free to search these databases . . . unconstrained by” federal
limits); see also Logan & Ferguson, supra note 73, at 551.
79
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Gregory Rodriguez, How Genealogy Became Almost as Popular as Porn, TIME (May 30,
2014), https://time.com/133811/how-genealogy-became-almost-as-popular-as-porn/.
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Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was the Year Consumer DNA Testing Blew Up, MIT TECH. REV.
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610233/2017-was-the-year-consumer-dnatesting-blew-up.
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seek to reveal much more than mere identification, they work differently than
CODIS. Ancestry explains that its “autosomal DNA test” is different than the
Y-chromosome or mitochondrial DNA tests because it surveys “a person’s entire
genome at over 700,000 locations. It covers both the maternal and paternal sides
of the family tree, so it covers all lineages.”83 And with customers wanting ever
more information about their backgrounds and their bodies, the success of these
genealogy projects has spawned spin-off companies, such as Habit and
Promethease, which take the DNA files prepared by 23andMe and Ancestry and
“provide a breakdown of people’s diet or health risks, frequently with little
oversight from regulators.”84
One such spinoff service is GEDmatch, the website successfully used by
law enforcement officers in the Golden State Killer case (and many other cases
since).85 GEDmatch allows users (at no cost) to upload their DNA test results
(such as from Ancestry and 23andMe) to a centralized website.86 From there,
GEDmatch converts the original data “to a form that makes it more efficient for
the software to perform searches and comparisons” and loads it into a relational
database in a “compressed binary format” called “tokenization.”87 By using
services such as GEDmatch, users can maximize their chances of finding new
biological relatives by comparing their DNA results across a broader spectrum
than the individual databases maintained separately by each commercial service.
The massive expansion of the genealogy industry has led to the curious
situation where millions of average, law-abiding persons have voluntarily given
their DNA to corporations (for a fee) to test and store in massive databases. And
this practice has blossomed even while a privacy battle has been waging in the
courts over government efforts through CODIS and NDIS to take DNA samples
from those convicted and accused of crimes for the primary purpose of
identification. Thus, it was only a matter of time before savvy law enforcement
officers recognized the potential in these private DNA databases, filled with new
and diverse samples, to locate criminal perpetrators (or their biological families)
who had evaded discovery because their DNA samples had never been loaded
into government-controlled databases.

83
AncestryDNA
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Asked
Questions,
https://www.ancestry.com/dna/en/legal/us/faq#about-3 (last visited Aug. 29, 2019).
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WASH.
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(Apr.
28,
2018),
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4. Charting Privacy Association Levels (PALs)
Before analyzing DNA privacy issues through the lens of the Fourth
Amendment, it is helpful to have a common frame of reference. The chart below
outlines what might be called “privacy association levels” (“PALs”), which are
intended only in a descriptive and referential way. No doubt, there are other ways
to conceptualize the spectrum of involved privacy interests, and some may
disagree about the order of placement of these items on the spectrum. But the
chart is intended merely to provide a common reference point for discussion for
the remainder of this Article.
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As the chart suggests, the privacy area of closest association to the
subject of a criminal investigation is when the DNA is still present in the
subject’s body. The PAL chart moves progressively away from this closest
privacy association when the subject voluntarily provides DNA test results to
third parties, the public at large, and, finally, the police. The chart next moves to
the privacy interest (if any) that criminal subjects have in the DNA of biological
relatives, following a similar attenuation when those relatives provide their DNA
results to third parties, the public at large, and, finally, the police. The discussions
throughout this Article will reference these various scenarios by their PAL level
(e.g., a Level 2 search of a criminal subject’s DNA test results while still in the
owner’s personal possession).
III. APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO DNA TESTS AFTER CARPENTER
Part III of this Article examines whether the Fourth Amendment applies
to police searches of DNA databases and private genealogy sites. It approaches
the problem from the perspective of individual subjects of criminal investigation,
first applying the modern analysis begun in Katz and asking whether criminal
subjects possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their own DNA and in
the DNA of their biological relatives. The discussion next considers those same
questions under the traditional property-based approach to the Fourth
Amendment, which has made a comeback in recent years. This Article separately
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addresses the third-party doctrine in Part IV. While third-party considerations
could be examined as part of a Katz analysis, the discussion is clearer if analyzed
separately, as the Court did in Carpenter.
A. Analyzing Genetic Privacy Under the Katz Approach
The “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis created in Katz has
become the lodestar of Fourth Amendment case law, even though the Supreme
Court has recently labored to restore the traditional property-rights analysis to its
rightful place in Fourth Amendment thinking. As Justice Clarence Thomas has
explained, the Supreme Court developed this modern analysis by adopting the
methodology proposed by Justice John Marshall Harlan in his concurring
opinion in Katz, in which he “identified a ‘twofold requirement’ to determine
when the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply: ‘first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”’”88 Over
time, the Supreme Court has “minimized” its inquiry into subjective intent,
leaving only the “objective prong—the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test
that the Court still applies today.”89
Referencing the various PALs in the chart at the end of Part II, this
section focuses on whether, under a Katz analysis, subjects of criminal
investigations have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their own DNA and
test results and in the DNA tests of their biological relatives.
1. Privacy at the Point of DNA Collection: Levels 1 and 2
As the descriptive PAL chart suggests above, the closest privacy
association for DNA testing is while the DNA is still within the criminal subject’s
body, prior to collection by the police—a Level 1 association. Here, the Supreme
Court and legal scholars agree the Fourth Amendment protects bodily fluids (and
other biological items) while still attached to the criminal subject.90 The Court
has made this point explicit in the DNA context, stating it “can be agreed that
using a buccal swab on the inner tissues of a person’s cheek in order to obtain
DNA samples is a search. Virtually any ‘intrusio[n] into the human body,’ will

88
89

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2237 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

Id. at 2238.
As Professor Andrew Ferguson has noted, the Fourth Amendment’s reference to “persons”
has been interpreted by the courts to include “intrusions into the human body to draw blood or
obtain saliva,” as well as to “excretions from the human body, such as urine and breath in a
breathalyzer.” Ferguson, supra note 8, at 854–55. “DNA recovered from a person was obviously
not considered by the Founders, but has been granted limited protection by the courts.” Id. at 855.
90
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work an invasion of ‘cherished personal security’ that is subject to constitutional
scrutiny.”91
Similarly, PAL Level 2 is primarily a theoretical construct that envisions
the situation where a criminal subject has not turned over DNA (or results of a
DNA test) to a third party, but where the DNA has left the subject’s body. In this
straightforward scenario, the DNA or test results should be treated as an “effect”
of the subject, much like a wedding ring or wallet in one’s pocket, and the police
should be held to the same Fourth Amendment standards as any physical object
in a person’s possession, typically considered within a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.92
While it is undisputed that criminal subjects have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their bodies and items within their possession, two
topics merit a pause for further consideration: (1) automatic DNA collection from
arrestees, and (2) DNA that is “abandoned” by criminal subjects.
First, in Maryland v. King,93 the Supreme Court approved Maryland’s
practice of automatically collecting DNA samples from certain arrestees.94 It had
already been assumed as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement that “the state does not need probable cause to compel DNA samples
from convicted offenders [who] are deemed to have a reduced expectation of
privacy in their genetic information.”95 In King, the Court went further, allowing
police to collect DNA samples from certain arrestees during the booking process
(and submitting that DNA to CODIS) as a means of “identifying” them—a
theory derided by Justice Scalia in dissent.96 Therefore, as long as the police
possess a (theoretical) interest in identifying certain arrestees, the Supreme Court
apparently will allow them to run DNA tests on samples collected without
probable cause as an automatic part of the booking process.
Second, DNA that has been “abandoned” by criminal suspects by exiting
their bodies—for instance, by spitting on the sidewalk, scratching skin cells from

91

Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446 (2013) (citations omitted) (providing examples to
include drawing blood, “scraping an arrestee’s fingernails to obtain trace evidence,” and
breathalyzer tests).
92
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (holding that the seizure of a lump
of cocaine found in a suspect’s pocket that was not immediately recognized as contraband by the
officer is unconstitutional).
93
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569 U.S. 435 (2013).
See generally id.
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Gabel, supra note 58, at 33 (citing United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir.
2004)).
In dissent, Justice Scalia contended Maryland did not use the arrestee’s DNA for
identification but for the purpose of solving unsolved crimes. King, 569 U.S. at 473 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (explaining the “logical” thing for Maryland to do if identification were its aim would
be to compare the arrestee’s DNA against CODIS’s “Convict and Arrestee Collection” known
database; however, Maryland was actually comparing the arrestee’s samples against CODIS’s
“Unsolved Crimes Collection” unknown database).
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their arms, or naturally shedding a strand of hair—is seemingly available for
police collection without a Fourth Amendment warrant.97 This is apparently so
even though, “[l]ike little else, DNA is exposed to the public and abandoned
every time we move.”98 Although the Supreme Court has not spoken definitively
on this subject, and some scholars argue against treating such DNA as
abandoned,99 the matter has been deemed largely a non-issue by lower courts that
have addressed it.100 For instance, in Raynor v. State,101 police took swabs of
DNA from where the defendant had been “rubbing his bare arms against the
armrests of the chair in which he had been seated.”102 During his unsuccessful
challenge to the police’s testing of that DNA, Raynor abandoned as fruitless any
argument that the collection of his DNA from the armchair was unlawful.103
2. Privacy in the “Whole of a Person’s Genetic Makeup”:
Levels 3, 4, and 5
The next three levels on the PAL chart involve criminal subjects who
give DNA or test results to a third party—a company like 23andMe (Level 3) or
a public website like GEDmatch (Level 4)—or to the police (Level 5). This
Article will not discuss the Level 5 scenario because it assumes a criminal subject
has made a knowing, voluntary waiver of any privacy rights after informed
consent. Further, third-party ramifications of the searches at Levels 3 and 4 will
be discussed in detail in Part IV in the context of the third-party doctrine, where
they are most relevant. Instead, this section will focus entirely on whether, in
light of the analysis in Carpenter, the Fourth Amendment should recognize a
freestanding privacy interest in the “whole of a person’s genetic makeup.”

97
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See Epstein, supra note 2, at 151–52.
Id. at 151.

99
See generally Albert E. Scherr, Genetic Privacy & the Fourth Amendment: Unregulated
Surreptitious DNA Harvesting, 47 GA. L. REV. 445 (2013) (arguing against current case law that
the Fourth Amendment should recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in some “abandoned”
DNA).
100
See id. at 447 n.1 (citing Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341, 351–52 (Mass. 2007)).
See also State v. Christian, No. 04-0900, 2006 WL 2419031, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2006);
State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 31 (Wash. 2007).
101
99 A.3d 753 (Md. 2014), cert. denied, Raynor v. Maryland, 135 S. Ct. 1509 (2015).
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Id. at 754–55.
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3. Pre-Carpenter Considerations
Carpenter found a privacy interest under the Fourth Amendment in the
“whole of a person’s physical movements.”104 In recognizing that interest, the
Court noted two guideposts from the Amendment: (1) securing “the privacies of
life” against “arbitrary power,” and (2) placing “obstacles in the way of a too
permeating police surveillance.”105 Similarly, some argue an interest should be
recognized in the content of one’s DNA.106 They see DNA as even more
sui generis than cell phones and argue it should qualify for special protection
because it contains “data that dwarfs the memory sticks of the average cell
phone,” is the “modern equivalent of the Domesday Book, an unalterable final
survey of everything human,” and is “even more revealing (present and future)”
than the technology in Riley and Carpenter.107 Moreover, Ferguson v. City of
Charleston108 provides support for a reasonable expectation of privacy in the test
results of one’s biological fluids (in that case, urine).109 Essentially, supporters
of a DNA privacy right argue for recognizing a privacy interest in the “whole of
a person’s genetic makeup.”
Maryland rejected a similar argument in Raynor v. State, where police
tested Raynor’s “abandoned” DNA left on the armrest of an interview chair.110
The court found that, while the “non-coding” DNA areas (i.e., “junk” DNA) are
useful to identify a person, they do not give access to “intimate [genetic]
information,” and police have “no incentive” to go beyond identification.111 And
even if they did, Raynor did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of his DNA (or at least the portion tested for identification).112 This

104
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (drawing the phrase from opinions
in Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 415, 430 (2012) (concurring opinions of Alito and
Sotomayor, JJ., respectively)).
105

Id. at 2213–14.
Strutin, supra note 6, at 366 (wondering after Riley why the cell phone should receive more
constitutional protections than the contents of the human body).
107
Id. at 361.
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532 U.S. 67 (2001).
Id. at 80–86 (finding a violation when a state hospital adopted a policy to screen the urine
of pregnant women for cocaine and refer them to police if they tested positive).
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Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 755 (Md. 2014), cert. denied, Raynor v. Maryland, 135 S. Ct.
1509 (2015); see also Hana Gandi, Why No Backlash?: Advances in Forensic Technology and the
Criminalized Fourth Amendment, 36 WHITTIER L. REV. 533, 552 (2015) (criticizing Raynor).
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reasoning tracked the Supreme Court’s discussion in King.113 The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals also rejected a related argument in 2006.114
But both those cases were decided prior to Carpenter, both involved
searches of CODIS, and neither involved a search into the more intimate data
contained on private DNA databases.115 In contrast, the Golden State Killer
investigation searched for a genetic mutation.116 Thus, a better argument can be
made after Carpenter, especially if the searched DNA test results go beyond
mere suspect identification.
Indeed, Carpenter provides new lines of argument. In recognizing a
privacy interest in “the whole of a person’s physical movements,”117 the Court
balanced five factors—“intimacy, comprehensiveness, expense, retrospectivity,
and voluntariness”118—that apply in the context of DNA testing. This balancing
was rightly criticized by the dissenters119 but could be applied here as one of the
alterations Carpenter made to Fourth Amendment law. This Article will apply
the factors below, taking them at face value without questioning the wisdom of
the Court in developing this multifactor test.
B. Applying Carpenter’s Five Factors
The first factor (Intimacy) recognizes that an activity is more likely to
be protected by the Fourth Amendment if it provides an “intimate window into a
person’s life, revealing . . . ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations,’”120 as well as a view into “private residences, doctor’s offices, . . .
and other potentially revealing locales.”121 Cell-site location information
(“CSLI”) met that criteria, and so might DNA results. Professor Sonia Suter
explains that DNA invokes the intimate notion of “personhood”—it is “unique
113
Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 464 (2013) (reasoning that “CODIS loci come from
noncoding parts of the DNA that do not reveal the genetic traits of the arrestee” and are not tested
for that purpose).
114
See Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (rejecting the argument that
police may not store a person’s “genetic fingerprint” in CODIS and “re-search” it and concluding
that accessing CODIS records is not a search because it matches “one piece of personal information
against government records”).
115
See generally id.; Raynor, 99 A.3d 753.
116
117
118

Oreskes et al., supra note 1.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210 (2018).

Justice Kennedy assigned these labels in dissent. Id. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2234 (criticizing the Majority’s “newly conceived” “multifactor analysis” as an
“unstable foundation”); see also id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the new
balancing test keeps Smith and Miller “on life support” while supplementing them with a
“multilayered inquiry” that seems like “Katz-squared”).
120
Id. at 2217 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
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to each of us and therefore personal in the sense that it identifies us.”122 It too
provides an intimate window into our lives: it “has a familial component,
revealing links with relatives”; it “makes us vulnerable to undesirable exposure
because it reveals intimate aspects of ourselves”; it can “stigmatize us” due to
our “genetic flaws”; and it “makes us vulnerable to discrimination by insurers,
employers, [and] future spouses.”123 Thus, although DNA does not reveal a
person’s movements, it does reveal the intimate (biological) essence of a
person’s nature.
The second factor (Comprehensiveness) recognizes that society’s
expectations about the comprehensiveness of law enforcement’s capabilities can
influence whether an expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable. For
instance, society had an expectation “that law enforcement agents and others
would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long
period.”124 With DNA, until the end of the last century, no one in society would
have expected the decoding of the human genome and the ability of law
enforcement to swab a cheek and comprehensively unlock the mysteries of a
person’s genetic makeup. That ability would have been in the realm of science
fiction until recently. This factor also weighs in favor of recognizing a reasonable
expectation of privacy in one’s genetic makeup.
The third factor (Expense) recognizes that the greater the ease and
inexpense with which the police can access private data “compared to traditional
investigative tools,” the greater the weight in favor of privacy rights.125 As with
the collection of CSLI, the efficiency of genetic testing (as demonstrated by the
Golden State Killer case) makes it cheap and easy for law enforcement to upload
a DNA sample on a free website (e.g., GEDmatch) and obtain previously
unknowable leads to uncover a serial killer from decades ago.126 Traditional
investigative tools were woefully inept at finding the Golden State Killer, yet
DNA tracking uncovered him with stunning alacrity. This factor also aligns in
favor of recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The fourth factor (Retrospectivity) recognizes that a government
intrusion with a “retrospective quality” that allows the police to learn past
information about a criminal subject even before coming under investigation
weighs in favor of privacy rights.127 As Carpenter found with CSLI, DNA testing
provides police an even more retrospective look into a criminal subject’s past.
122

Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of
Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 773 (2004).
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Id. at 739.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 430).

Id. at 2217–18.
Epstein, supra note 2, at 151–52 (“For DNA testing, the technology is not in the hands of
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While DNA does not reveal the past movements of individuals, it does reveal the
migrations of their ancestors, the true identity and biological history of their
families, their genetic mutations, and their predisposition for future disease. In
the process of searching for suspects using DNA databases, all this data can be
uncovered on a person who is not even under the gaze of suspicion for any
offense. This too weighs in favor of privacy.
The fifth factor (Voluntariness) recognizes that activities that are less
voluntary—either because of societal factors (e.g., those who “compulsively
carry cell phones with them all the time”) or because of the nature of technology
(e.g., “a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any
affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up”)—are more likely to
be considered private.128 In the context of genetic testing, DNA is shed by
everyone all day long wherever they go, and the advances in technology make it
ever more feasible to test that DNA. Also, DNA is often taken involuntarily (i.e.,
through arrest or conviction sampling requirements). Moreover, Carpenter
clarified that the Fourth Amendment is not “surrendered” merely because a
person ventures into the public sphere or because a private activity is “generated
for commercial purposes.”129 Thus, the criminal subjects in Levels 3 and 4 of the
PAL chart from Part II should not lose the ability to claim a protected privacy
interest merely because they generated DNA results as part of commercial
genealogy services or because they expected and welcomed some interaction in
the public sphere.
Finally, Carpenter clarified that, when evaluating the issue, courts may
consider the “continued increase in technology,” including the “more
sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”130 The
Carpenter Court looked beyond the facts of the case from 2011 and ruled based
on 2018 technology and beyond. One can only imagine what the future might
hold for DNA research. Even “junk DNA” may one day have the potential to
reveal intimate details about a person. Acting now to protect DNA under the
Fourth Amendment makes as much sense as protecting the CSLI in Carpenter.
In sum, the Supreme Court in King (and several lower courts) did not
seem amenable to recognizing a substantive privacy interest in a person’s own
genetic makeup. But those cases were limited to situations involving a CODIS
search of “junk DNA” for mere identification purposes, with the government’s
assurance it was not interested in searching for any other type of genetic data.
The private genealogy database question addressed in this Article raises the exact
situations the Supreme Court was avoiding in King (and for which Justice Scalia
derided the Majority). And after Carpenter—at least in a search of the criminal
suspect’s own DNA results generated by private companies—the five balancing
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Id. at 2218, 2220 (emphasis added).
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Id. at 2217.
Id. at 2218–19.
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factors are more likely to weigh in favor of recognizing a privacy interest under
the Fourth Amendment in the “whole of a person’s genetic makeup.”
1. Privacy in the DNA of a Biological Relative? Levels 6, 7, 8, and 9
In the prior two sections, this Article has contended that, under a Katz
Fourth Amendment analysis (in light of Carpenter and advancing technology),
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of their
DNA, whether it is in their body, in their personal possession, or even out of their
possession (subject to the third-party doctrine, to be discussed in Part IV).
But perhaps the most intriguing aspect of this issue is the way law
enforcement has located suspects by searching private genealogy databases for
the suspects’ biological relatives (i.e., “familial searching”).131 That is the
situation with Levels 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the PAL chart—it is the biological relatives
of the criminal subject whose own DNA or test results are either within their
possession (Level 6) or given to a third party (Level 7), a public website (Level
8), or the police (Level 9). These four levels will be analyzed together below for
reasons that will become apparent.
In the usual scenario, law enforcement—armed with an unknown DNA
sample—searches a private genealogy DNA database and discovers a DNA test
result that matches a biological relative of the unknown sample’s owner.132 The
police then use that DNA information to narrow down the list of potential
suspects, eventually discovering the identity of the actual perpetrator through the
use of other investigative means and techniques.133 In this process, what privacy
interests are implicated? As one commentator noted, this creates a “fourth-party
problem of sorts” because it raises the question of whether a criminal suspect has
any legal interest in a family member’s DNA that has been uploaded to a
commercial DNA database.134
Adding yet another wrinkle, it may be impossible for the police to
prevent the actual suspect’s DNA from exposure during one of these “biological
relative” database searches.135 A broad search of a database for the relative of a
suspect might very well reveal the suspect’s own DNA data because in these
familial searches “the word ‘relative’ can refer to ‘the person in the database, any

131
Murphy, supra note 57, at 297–98 (explaining “when a database search does not turn up an
exact match, it is possible to follow up with a moderate- or low-stringency search that returns
partial matches—profiles that match some, but not all, of the sample’s alleles”—usually up to 25
persons).
132
133
134
135

See, e.g., supra note 4 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., id.
Ford, supra note 15.
See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 57, at 298.
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of that person’s kin (suspected sources of the material), as well as the actual
source of the material.’”136
To simplify the analysis, this Article will assume the police can search a
genealogy database and find a relative without uncovering the DNA results of
the actual suspect. Given that caveat, does a suspect have a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” in the DNA of a distant relative (or a close relative, for
that matter)? Put another way, does the suspect have a personal privacy interest
in the genetic material coming from a relative’s body? The answer to that
question is “no.”137
The primary problem is “standing”—a doctrine that “focuses on whether
the person seeking to challenge the legality of a search as a basis for suppressing
evidence was himself the ‘victim’ of the search or seizure.”138 “The Supreme
Court’s expectation of privacy cases deny standing to other family members, as
Fourth Amendment rights are deemed ‘personal.’”139 The Court has held that
personal rights “may not be vicariously asserted,” and therefore a person who
had damaging evidence found “by a search of a third person’s premises or
property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.”140 Here,
criminal subjects who seek to apply the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence
obtained through the search of DNA samples of biological relatives are
attempting to vicariously assert the rights of their third-party relatives. The
subjects are not the victims. The only ones who could raise an objection would
be the biological family members themselves.
A way of addressing the standing problem here is to simply recognize
that a person does not—subjectively or objectively—have an expectation of
privacy in someone else’s body. While that should end the matter, after
Carpenter it is fair to ask whether a right to the “whole of a person’s genetic
material” might be stretched to include “genetic material held in common with a
relative.” If someone else’s DNA can reveal private data about criminal subjects,
one might argue the subjects have some expectation that their portion of the DNA
will remain private (at least from the police).
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Id. at 298.

See id. at 334 (“What constitutional interest does the lawfully databased person, or that
person’s relatives, have in that search? . . . [U]nder conventional doctrine, none.”).
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Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132 (1978).
Epstein, supra note 2, at 161–62. Professor Epstein cites several articles critical of this
doctrine, including Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Fourth Amendment Standing: A New Paradigm
Based on Article III Rules and Right to Privacy, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 669, 681 (2006) (arguing to
broaden the standing doctrine to include “anyone against whom the evidence is being introduced”).
140
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133–34. The doctrine partly stems from the Court’s desire to limit the
use of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule only to benefit those whose rights have been
violated. “Even if such a person is not a defendant in the action, he may be able to recover damages
for the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights or seek redress under state law for invasion of
privacy or trespass.” Id. at 134.
139
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The problem with this theory is twofold. Subjectively, it seems
implausible most people believe they have a privacy interest in biological data
contained in the body of a relative (who they might never have met). Even if such
a person with that subjective belief could be found, objectively—although there
is no objective data to support this next statement—it seems society would not
be willing to go that far in recognizing such an asserted privacy right as
reasonable. To ask the question is nearly to answer it because it seems so far
removed from any current societal beliefs. It is unlike the dubious, but nowaccepted, proposition under Katz that “individuals can have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in another person’s property.”141
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s abortion precedents involving the right of
privacy have made it clear that one person (i.e., the father) does not have an
actionable privacy interest in the body of another person (i.e., the mother of the
father’s child) while that child is within the mother’s womb. 142 And if a father
does not have an actionable privacy interest in that circumstance, it seems
unlikely a relative could assert a constitutionally protected privacy interest in the
DNA of another.143 Moreover, such an assertion would be difficult to control
with any reasonable limiting principle, since 99.7% of genetic material is also
shared with every other person on the planet. In light of that statistic, at what
point would such a privacy interest cease?
For those reasons, a Katz analysis under the circumstances in Levels 6,
7, 8, and 9 of the PAL chart leads to the conclusion that a criminal subject has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the DNA or test results of a biological
relative. In sum, while criminal subjects of a police genealogy search might be
able to assert a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in their own DNA or test
results (subject to the third-party doctrine), they have no right to assert the
privacy interests of biological relatives, whose DNA might be exposed to police
intrusion as part of a familial search.

141
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2242 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[A]
person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house of someone else.” (citing
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)).
142
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 838 (1992) (striking down a provision
requiring woman to notify husband of abortion decision, stating “it cannot be claimed that the
father’s interest in the fetus’ welfare is equal to the mother’s protected liberty, since it is an
inescapable biological fact that state regulation with respect to the fetus will have a far greater
impact on the pregnant woman’s bodily integrity than it will on the husband”); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 165 n.67 (1973) (“Neither in this opinion nor in Doe v. Bolton . . . do we discuss the
father’s rights, if any exist in the constitutional context, in the abortion decision. No paternal right
has been asserted in either of the cases . . . .”).
143

See also Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch
Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 257–58 (2006) (arguing Due Process does not give a
parent the right to challenge the search of a child’s DNA, even though a parent has a right to control
a child’s upbringing and education).
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C. Analyzing Genetic Privacy Under the Traditional Property-Rights
Approach
The Supreme Court recently has sought to restore the traditional preKatz property-rights analysis under the Fourth Amendment. But would applying
a property-based analysis in the DNA context lead to a different result than a
Katz analysis? Referencing the various privacy levels in the PAL chart at the end
of Part II, this section addresses that question.
1. Restoring a Traditional Property-Based Approach to the Fourth
Amendment
In Jones, the Supreme Court signaled its desire to restore the traditional
property-based approach to its rightful analytical place under the Fourth
Amendment because the Court had unwittingly displaced it by the Katz
analysis.144 Justice Scalia explained the Court’s Fourth Amendment cases had
been tied to common-law trespass “at least until the latter half of the 20th
century,” but that its jurisprudence had “deviated from that exclusively propertybased approach” beginning with Katz.145 He observed that Katz merely had
“established that ‘property rights are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment
violations,’ but did not ‘snuf[f] out the previously recognized protection for
property,’” and that Katz “did not erode the principle ‘that, when the Government
does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to
obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.’”146
The Carpenter Court did not use a property-based approach in finding a
privacy interest in the “whole of a person’s movements,” and the dissenters
accused the Majority of “unhing[ing] Fourth Amendment doctrine from the
property-based concepts that have long grounded the analytic framework that
pertains in these cases.”147 These dissents are most appropriately discussed in
Part IV (when evaluating the third-party doctrine), but one dissenting view is
helpful to discuss in this section of the Article. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in
Carpenter offered “another way” of re-envisioning the Court’s cases under Katz
using the traditional property-based approach, recognizing that it might extend
more rights than the historically inconsistent results of the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” approach. Justice Gorsuch—having taken Justice
Scalia’s seat after his death—seems to have taken up the late Justice’s mantle in
restoring (or revolutionizing) that traditional property-based approach.
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See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405–07 (2012).

Id. at 405.
Id. at 407 (emphasis omitted) (citing Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56 (1992) and United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
147
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2224 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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In the context of the facts in Carpenter, for instance, Justice Gorsuch
called it “entirely possible” that “a person’s cell-site data could qualify as his
papers or effects under existing law” despite that “the telephone carrier holds the
information,” because various federal laws give customers “substantial legal
interests” and “certain rights to control use of and access to” CSLI, including a
federally created “private cause of action for damages against carriers who
violate” those laws.148 But Justice Gorsuch lamented that “we do not know
anything more” in the record because Carpenter had forfeited any property-based
arguments by failing to raise them before the lower courts: “In these
circumstances, I cannot help but conclude—reluctantly—that Mr. Carpenter
forfeited perhaps his most promising line of argument.”149
Some scholars see Justice Gorsuch’s opinion as “the most important
aspect of Carpenter” for those “who have long been frustrated by the Fourth
Amendment’s bizarre reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test,” with a bold
prediction that “Carpenter represents the beginning of what will likely be a
growing shift away from Katz and its progeny.”150 But in the context of DNA
testing, could the property-based approach truly provide the same or greater
rights to criminal subjects as that provided under Katz? That is the question for
the remainder of this section.
2. Property Interest in One’s Own DNA: Levels 1 through 5
Earlier, this Article argued the Katz analysis would yield a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” in one’s own DNA and test results because society was
willing to recognize an objective expectation that one’s own DNA will not be
plundered by the police, especially while it is in one’s own body or personal
possession. It also suggested the not-yet-established proposition that a
freestanding privacy interest in the “whole of a person’s genetic makeup” might
be recognized as objectively reasonable by society in light of the balancing
factors articulated in Carpenter. A property-based analysis could reach a similar
result via a different route.
To find recognition under the Fourth Amendment, the Court has
traditionally looked to positive law and the common law to establish whether an
individual has any property rights in a particular interest. In their joint Carpenter
dissent, Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas explained how a traditional
property-based approach would proceed: the Court would “first ask[] whether
the object of the search—say, a house, papers, or effects—belonged to the

148
149

Id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id.

150
Trevor Burrus & James Knight, Katz Nipped and Katz Cradled: Carpenter and the Evolving
Fourth Amendment, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 79, 110–11 (2017–2018).
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defendant, and, if it did, whether the Government had committed a ‘trespass’ in
acquiring the evidence at issue.”151
Using that analysis here, the Court would first identify the object of the
search—in this case, a person’s DNA or the results of a DNA test—and then
determine whether that object belonged to the defendant. Therefore, the question
posed would be whether an individual has a property interest in their own
biological cells and the results of testing done on those cells. Although some
Supreme Court Justices have expressed doubt about property interests in
“abandoned” bodily fluids,152 after Carpenter the answer to that question may be
“yes” for three reasons.
First, as a matter of positive law, some legislatures recognize property
interests associated with DNA and test results, declaring them to be the property
of the individual.153 For instance, Florida decrees “the results of . . . DNA
analysis, whether held by a public or private entity[, to be] the exclusive property
of the person tested.”154 These declarations of positive law—though currently in
a minority of states—indicate that ownership rights in DNA and test results may
be enforceable property interests. As Justice Gorsuch discussed in his Carpenter
dissent, “positive law may help provide detailed guidance on evolving
technologies without resort to judicial intuition” because legislatures “often
create[] rights in both tangible and intangible things.”155
Second, the genealogy companies themselves recognize that property
and contract law ascribe ownership rights, as a general matter, to those users who
submit DNA to their sites. For instance, according to the terms of service
governing Ancestry’s customers, those who submit their DNA “always maintain
ownership of [their] data,” and Ancestry must get their informed consent prior to

151
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2259 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400, 411 (2012)).
152
See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 92 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted) (joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J.) (“I suppose the testing of that urine for traces
of unlawful drugs could be considered a search of sorts, but . . . it is entirely unrealistic to regard
urine as one of the ‘effects’ (i.e., part of the property) of the person who has passed and abandoned
it.”).
153
Colorado and Georgia recognize that “genetic information is the unique property of the
individual” who is tested (and to whom the information pertains). COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-31104.7(1)(a) (West 2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (West 2019). Alaska legislates that “a DNA
sample and the results of a DNA analysis performed on the sample are the exclusive property of
the person sampled or analyzed.” ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.13.010(a)(2) (West 2019). Louisiana
explains that “genetic information is the property of the insured or enrollee. No person shall retain
an insured’s or enrollee’s genetic information without first obtaining authorization.” LA. STAT.
ANN. § 22:1023(E) (West 2019). Other states are considering similar legislation.
154

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40(2)(a) (West 2019).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2270 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). But Justice Gorsuch noted one
limitation: “[W]hile positive law may help establish a person’s Fourth Amendment interest there
may be some circumstances where positive law cannot be used to defeat it.” Id.
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conducting research on submitted DNA.156 Ancestry’s terms of service also state,
“You own your Personal Information, Additional User Information, and User
Provided Content,” and they require their customers to grant Ancestry “the right
to collect, host, transfer, process, analyze, communicate and store your Personal
Information (including your Genetic Information) and Additional User
Information” to provide the sites’ genealogy services.157 While 23andMe’s terms
are not as explicit (or as generous to its customers), they do reflect an
understanding that their users have rights (to waive).158 And publicly available
genealogy sites, such as GEDmatch, also ascribe property interests to their
customers. As GEDmatch’s terms acknowledge, “Raw DNA data uploaded to
GEDmatch.Com (‘Raw Data’) remains the property of the person who uploaded
it.”159 Moreover, GEDmatch recognizes that the owner of the results has the
ability to remove them from the website at any time, thus preventing further use
of the test results by the site.160
Third, even where positive law does not expressly define a property
interest in DNA and test results, courts may look to broader property-law
concepts to determine the existence of that interest. For instance, in the 1990
California Supreme Court decision, Moore v. Regents of the University of
California,161 the court concluded a patient did not have a valid claim for the tort
of conversion because he did not retain a sufficient property interest in cells
removed from his body and used for research without his consent.162 The
Majority did, however, recognize a property right in those cells still in the
patient’s body, even though it did not find sufficient precedent at that time to
establish a continuing ownership right once the cells were removed.163
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See 23andMe Terms and Conditions, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/tos/ (last
visited Aug. 29, 2019). According to the terms:
Waiver of Property Rights: You understand that by providing any sample . . .
you acquire no rights in any research or commercial products that may be
developed by 23andMe or its collaborating partners. You specifically
understand that you will not receive compensation for any research or
commercial products that include or result from your Genetic Information or
Self-Reported Information.
159
GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, supra note 86.
160
Id. GEDmatch explains the process to deny the site further use of the property: “A link or
other means is provided within your GEDmatch account to remove your Raw Data from the Site.
Alternatively, you can request deletion of your personal information at any time . . . .” Id.
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793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
Id. at 488–97.
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See id. at 493 (“[W]e do not purport to hold that excised cells can never be property for any
purpose whatsoever.”).
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In dissent in Moore, Justice Stanley Mosk discussed the broader
property-law issues that could undergird an argument in favor of finding a
general property interest. He observed that “concepts of property and ownership”
are extremely broad and include “everything which one person can own and
transfer to another” and “every species of right and interest capable of being
enjoyed as such upon which it is practicable to place a money value.”164 He
explained that property refers to a “bundle of rights and privileges as well as of
obligations”165—principally “the rights to possess the property, to use the
property, to exclude others from the property, and to dispose of the property by
sale or by gift.”166 Thus, even if the law “limits or even forbids the exercise of
certain rights over certain forms of property,” other rights in the bundle might
persist and “what remains is still deemed in law to be a protectible property
interest.”167 He concluded that, in the absence of any authority negating the
claimed property right in the excised cells, “the right falls within the traditionally
broad concept of property in our law.”168 Justice Mosk’s argument, though in
dissent in that case, provides a strong basis for the further claim that—even in
the absence of positive law—a court could recognize a property interest based
on evidence demonstrating the presence of some or all of the tell-tale “bundle of
rights.”
Here, as the terms of service from genealogy sites illustrate, the owner
of DNA samples and test results may negotiate for some remuneration for the
company to access test result data or compare their DNA sample to others,
whether for research, patent development, or some other commercial purpose.
That these companies require waivers from their customers, including waivers
of rights in potential patents and other intellectual property products, indicates
the DNA and test results have a marketable value. The weight of the evidence
demonstrates that both the DNA sample and the results of a DNA test possess
the characteristics of the “bundle of rights” associated with property ownership.
For instance, by denying consent for research, the owner of the DNA test results
can prevent Ancestry from using those results in research. And by removing data
from GEDmatch, the owner can prevent the site from its further use. Finally,
some broker websites already offer money for DNA samples.169
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Id. at 509 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Yuba River Power Co. v. Nev. Irrigation Dist.,
279 P. 128 (Cal. 1929)).
165
Id. at 509 (quoting Union Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 386 P.2d 496, 500 (Cal.
1963)).
166
Id. at 509.
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Id. at 509–10.
Id. at 510.

Companies are already trading DNA samples for cash. See Ali Montag, This Company Will
Pay You $50 for Your Spit—and Mark Cuban Just Invested $200,000 on ‘Shark Tank’, CNBC
MAKE IT (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/13/mark-cuban-invested-200000-indna-simple-on-shark-tank-heres-why.html; How Much Money Can You Make Selling Your DNA?,

2019]

23 AND PLEA

83

Once the existence of a property right in one’s DNA and test results is
accepted, the final step in the Fourth Amendment analysis is to determine
“whether the Government had committed a ‘trespass’ in acquiring the evidence
at issue.”170 The value of the property interest here—the DNA and its test
results—are the contents themselves. Thus, any intrusion into the contents of the
tests (which, in turn, reveals the contents of the DNA) could be considered a
trespass. Conducting a search of a database containing the property of criminal
subjects and accessing the raw data of their DNA test results to compare with
other samples (for identification or other purposes) would be a clear trespass on
the claimed property interests, resulting in a Fourth Amendment violation unless
some authorization exists (such as a third-party issue, discussed in Part IV, or the
presence of a warrant or warrant exception showing reasonableness).
3. Property Interest in Another’s DNA: Levels 6 through 9
The prior section used a traditional property-based approach to the
Fourth Amendment and established a more direct and perhaps stronger argument
than Katz to recognize a privacy interest in one’s DNA and test results. But
property law would not support the type of claim presented in Levels 6 through
9 of the PAL chart, where the claimed property interest involves DNA belonging
to another person. No accepted principle of property law would support the
notion that one person “owns” another person’s DNA as a matter of natural right.
Professor Erin Murphy has attempted to articulate a theory that might be
applicable in this context, although it is mostly an argument under Katz. Her
argument focuses on the rights of biological relatives who have been identified
through a familial DNA search as relatives of a suspected criminal, and the
impact on their lives and intrusion into their privacy by being associated with the
suspected criminal.171 She suggests these family members might have a
“protectable interest in the privacy of their half of the databased kin’s genetic
code.”172 The theory would be that the family member “has a protected right not
to have her own genetic information exposed, if you will, by the fact of her kin’s
conviction. Such an interest could be likened to the joint interest held by property
owners who share common space,”173 as in a situation where two condo owners
ENCRYPGEN, https://encrypgen.com/how-much-money-can-you-make-selling-your-dna/ (last
visited Aug. 29, 2019) (explaining EncrypGen is “poised to . . . tip the scales in favor of the
consumer/DNA data holder by putting them in control of their personal genomic data and allowing
them to be paid for sharing their DNA rather than surrendering it to the testing companies”).
170
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2259 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting).
171
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See Murphy, supra note 57, at 336.
Id. at 336.

Id. Murphy goes on to argue that “the partial match search, and the inference drawn from
the match itself, invoke constitutional scrutiny because they intrude on the legitimate expectation
of privacy held by the relative in her half of the offender’s genetic code, and are impermissible
because they do so without individualized or particularized suspicion.” Id. at 337.
173
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in the same condominium share a common area in which they have a shared
interest. If Professor Murphy’s argument has validity, then it could be applied in
both directions. For instance, the criminal subject’s DNA would also be
“exposed” to the public insofar as it is matched to the biological relative’s
sample. The subject could then make the identical argument as the family
member, in reverse.
But the argument is problematic. The analogy of a “joint interest held by
property owners who share common space” conflates the geographic areas
involved. The analogy in the DNA context would not be two condo owners who
share a common space in the same condominium. Instead, the analogy would be
two condo owners who each live and own a condo in separate complexes, except
that the common-area floorplans are identical in both condos. (Perhaps they were
built by the same developer.) No property-law principle would allow the owner
in one condo to have legal say in the affairs of the other condominium, no matter
how identical the common-area floorplans. Therefore—to a much lesser extent
than under a Katz analysis—the traditional property-based approach would not
support an argument affirming a property interest in another person’s DNA. 174
There would be no personal Fourth Amendment interest at stake, and standing
limits again would prevent the criminal subject from vicariously asserting the
property rights of a third party.
In sum, both the Katz and property-based analyses reach similar results,
as discussed in this Part. Both can be used to put forward a plausible argument
that the Fourth Amendment should protect the interests of a person in their own
DNA and test results, even when those results are in the possession of others
(setting aside until Part IV the issue of the third-party doctrine). And both
theories should not be interpreted to support an attempt to claim a natural privacy
interest in the DNA or test results of another person.
IV. GENETIC PRIVACY AND THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE AFTER CARPENTER
Part III of this Article concluded that criminal subjects whose DNA or
test results were searched by the government likely would be protected by the
Fourth Amendment with regard to their own DNA, but not so for the DNA results
of biological relatives. Throughout the discussion, the issue of the third-party
doctrine was deferred for later analysis, even though the outcome of that question
could very well negate the privacy interest provisionally recognized above. Now,
Part IV of this Article addresses the doctrine after Carpenter. First, it explains
the history of the third-party doctrine and how the Carpenter Court cabined the

174
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Majority’s
“destabiliz[ing]” reasoning under Katz, calling it “revolutionary” that the Court would allow a
defendant “to object to the search of a third party’s property”). Any theory that might allow this
type of claim here would come under Katz, as in Carpenter, and not the traditional property-based
approach. See supra Section III.A.

2019]

23 AND PLEA

85

doctrine for future Fourth Amendment cases. Then, this Part examines whether
the Court would use the same reasoning as in Carpenter to place limitations on
the third-party doctrine in the context of DNA testing. During the discussion, it
will analyze the doctrine from both a Katz-based and property-based approach to
the Fourth Amendment.
A. The Third-Party Doctrine and the Carpenter Decision
This section outlines the history of the third-party doctrine and how
Carpenter might have changed that doctrine for the future where new
technologies are involved. It explores the basis of the doctrine through the eyes
of the Carpenter Court and examines the alternative positions of some of the
dissenting Justices.
1. The History of the Third-Party Doctrine
After Katz, with the Supreme Court expanding its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence to include “reasonable expectations of privacy,” the Court’s new
direction had the potential to disrupt the effectiveness of law enforcement by
placing restrictions on common investigative techniques (e.g., tracking money
transactions made through financial institutions), surreptitious surveillance
(e.g., tracking phone numbers dialed through the switchboard), and undercover
operations (e.g., recruiting informants and wiring them to record incriminating
conversations). Because none of these law enforcement practices involved a
trespass on the property of a suspect, traditional notions of the Fourth
Amendment had not triggered its protections. But all of that changed with Katz
because defendants could now argue they reasonably believed their bank records
would be kept private, the phone numbers they dialed would not be recorded,
and their conversations would not be taped.
These police techniques had one thing in common: the cooperation of a
third party (a bank, a telephone company, an informant). Enter the third-party
doctrine, which generally holds that, by disclosing information to a third party,
“the subject gives up all of his Fourth Amendment rights in the information
revealed.”175 The Court first articulated the doctrine in United States v. Miller,176
which upheld a police subpoena of Miller’s banks records, gathering “several
months of canceled checks, deposit slips, and monthly statements.”177 By
revealing his affairs to a third party (the bank), Miller had assumed the risk the
bank might convey his personal data to the police.178 In explaining Miller, the
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Carpenter Court listed three reasons Miller had no privacy interest in the bank
records: he could “assert neither ownership nor possession” of the records
because “they were ‘business records of the banks’”; the checks were “not
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in
commercial transactions”; and “the bank statements contained information
‘exposed to [bank] employees in the ordinary course of business.’”179 It did not
matter that Miller assumed the bank would use his personal information solely
for a limited purpose.180
The Supreme Court expanded the third-party doctrine in Smith v.
Maryland,181 which upheld police use of a “pen register—a device that recorded
the outgoing phone numbers dialed on a landline telephone”—because Smith
assumed the risk when he conveyed the dialed numbers to the phone company.182
In explaining Smith, the Carpenter Court detailed three reasons Smith had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed on his phone: a pen
register has “limited capabilities”; it is doubtful “people in general entertain any
actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial”; and telephone
subscribers know “the numbers are used by the telephone company ‘for a variety
of legitimate business purposes,’ including routing calls.”183
After Katz, the Court continued to approve the police use of informants
under an assumption-of-risk theory, even where the informant gained the
defendant’s trust to enter into his home or recorded conversations wearing a
wire.184 As Justice Scalia later quipped, “Abuse of trust is surely a sneaky and
ungentlemanly thing, and perhaps there should be (as there are) laws against such
conduct by the government. . . . That, however, is immaterial” because a
person’s misplaced trust in a colleague is “not protected by the Fourth
Amendment when it turns out that the colleague is a government agent regularly
communicating with the authorities.”185
As new technologies arose, courts expanded the third-party doctrine to
approve police operations intercepting other information held by third parties:
“subscriber information, the length of . . . stored files, . . . and a sender’s name,
email address, and [internet protocol] address.”186 Even as the doctrine expanded,
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preserving the ability of police to continue normal operations, the Supreme Court
warned that the doctrine had limits. The Court drew a key distinction between
the permissible interception of “non-content” information—items noted above—
and the prohibited interception of “content” data, such as the substance of phone
conversations, the content of messages, and “items that are not directed to the
third-party intermediary (such as the [internet service provider]), but rather to a
specific recipient.”187 And in certain instances the Court ignored the doctrine
entirely due to other privacy concerns.188
The third-party doctrine has been criticized as “dead wrong,” “a mockery
of the Fourth Amendment,” “among the most maligned constitutional doctrines,”
and “one of the most serious threats to privacy in the digital age.”189 Some worry
about the “chilling effect” that “stem[s] from anxiety about where sensitive
information, once collected, might flow.”190 Others believe the Supreme Court
never articulated a “clear argument in its favor,” with some finding the doctrine
to be “unexplained” or merely results-oriented.191 In United States v. Jones,
Justice Sotomayor questioned if the doctrine could survive in a digital age where
people “reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the
course of carrying out mundane tasks.”192 Even a newly-appointed Justice
Gorsuch joined the chorus of critics, contending the Court has “never offered a
persuasive justification” for the third-party doctrine, and that it could lead to the
demise of the Fourth Amendment in the digital age.193
By the time of Carpenter, some believed the doctrine had outlived its
usefulness.
2. The Impact of the Carpenter Decision
Carpenter finally put the brakes on the third-party doctrine in the face of
evolving technology, refusing to “mechanically” apply the doctrine to cell-site
location information (CSLI), a “distinct category of information.”194 Yet the
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Court purportedly did not overturn the third-party doctrine, opting instead to
“decline to extend” it under the unique circumstances of the case.195
The Court gave two reasons for rejecting the doctrine’s application in
Carpenter. First, the primary rationale for the third-party doctrine—i.e., only
limited information can be gleaned from data such as telephone numbers or
publicly negotiable checks—did not apply to CSLI, which “implicates privacy
concerns far beyond those considered in Smith and Miller” and involves “seismic
shifts in digital technology” that make it possible to track the location of
“everyone . . . for years and years.”196 But in dissent, Justice Kennedy saw CSLI
as “no different from the many other kinds of business records the Government
has a lawful right to obtain” through the subpoena process.197
Second, the Court concluded that the assumption-of-risk rationale—
i.e, that “information knowingly shared with another” creates a “reduced
expectation of privacy”—did not apply because CSLI “is not truly ‘shared’ as
one normally understands the term” due to the “indispensable” requirement to
carry a cell phone for “participation in modern society” and because cell phones
log location data “without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond
powering up,” thus defeating the notion the user “assumed the risk” in any
“meaningful sense.”198
One key argument made by the dissenting Justices was that the Majority
had created instability with regard to the subpoena power.199 Justice Alito gave
an in-depth analysis of the subpoena issue,200 while Justice Kennedy pointed out
perceived absurdities in the Court’s holding.201 Justice Kennedy contrasted
warrants, which allow “the Government to enter and seize and make the
examination itself,” with subpoenas that “simply require[] the person to whom it
is directed to make the disclosure. A subpoena, moreover, provides the recipient

195
196

Id. at 2220.
Id. at 2219–20.

197

Id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Kennedy contended financial and telephone records
pose as great a danger as CSLI, disclosing “how much money they make; the political and religious
organizations to which they donate; whether they have visited a psychiatrist, plastic surgeon,
abortion clinic, or AIDS treatment center; whether they go to gay bars or straight ones; and who
are their closest friends and family members.” Id. at 2232.
198
Id. at 2219–20 (majority opinion).
199

See id. at 2247–57 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2224–32 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2247–57 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing the Majority’s mistake on the subpoena
issue in depth).
201
Id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (deriding the Majority’s view that “the Government
can acquire a record of every credit card purchase and phone call a person makes over months or
years without upsetting a legitimate expectation of privacy,” but that it cannot obtain “a court’s
approval to issue a subpoena for more than six days of cell-site records in order to determine
whether a person was within several hundred city blocks of a crime scene”).
200

2019]

23 AND PLEA

89

the ‘opportunity to present objections’ before complying, which further mitigates
the intrusion.”202
Some scholars see in Carpenter the beginning of a broader rethinking of
the Fourth Amendment, especially the third-party doctrine. The decision shows
the Court is “willing to reconsider old doctrines that do not fit with the realities
of the digital age,” and it “frees lower courts from the dead hand of Smith and
Miller to protect data of comparable ‘depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach’
to CSLI.”203 Others are skeptical that Carpenter will have significant impact on
the doctrine, recognizing that the Court’s holding is “fairly narrow and unique to
cell-site location information,” due to the “ubiquity of cell phones.”204 Some find
it unlikely the case will “extend Fourth Amendment protections to the acquisition
and utilization of other digital identifiers and tracers, such as Internet Protocol
(‘IP’) addresses and general forms of metadata.”205
B. Applying the Third-Party Doctrine to Genealogy Websites
This section applies the third-party doctrine after Carpenter in the
context of private genealogy websites, such as Ancestry and 23andMe, and
publicly available sites such as GEDmatch, which has often been used by law
enforcement to track down relatives of suspected criminals. It first explains how
these sites work from the perspective of individuals handing over their intimate
DNA data to third parties. Returning to the PAL chart from Part II, this section
then explores whether the post-Carpenter third-party doctrine will negate Fourth
Amendment privacy interests in the DNA context. Discussion will focus solely
on PAL Levels 3 and 4, where individuals provide their own DNA or test results
to third parties—either a private company, such as Ancestry (Level 3), or a
publicly available website, such as GEDmatch (Level 4).
1. Information Given to Genealogy Websites
Assuming individuals have a protected Fourth Amendment privacy
interest in their own DNA and the results of DNA testing—either through a
traditional property-based analysis or the modern Katz approach—the question
then becomes whether that privacy interest is defeated through application of the
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third-party doctrine. To help assess this question in the context of genealogy
websites, it is critical to determine what information is passed to these third
parties and under what limitations, if any. This is so because scholars have
synthesized two components to help determine whether the third-party doctrine
will apply to private data conveyed to third parties. “First, all information must
be voluntarily conveyed to a third party before it loses Fourth Amendment
protection. Second, only third-party participants have the authority to consent to
disclosure; mere intermediaries do not.”206 The conditions under which data is
transmitted to third parties sheds light on the voluntariness and extent of sharing.
The first area of inquiry in third-party doctrine scenarios looks at the
“voluntariness” of conveying the data to the third party. Of course, individuals
who spit in a tube and provide their DNA to genealogy companies such as
23andMe or Ancestry, are voluntarily providing these companies with DNA
samples. As discussed earlier, these samples are chock full of intimate
information: data about one’s heritage, close and distant relatives, Neanderthal
connections, genetic mutations, genetic predispositions to certain diseases and
other medical information. This information could be used to predict life
expectancy, future health care costs, and (science fiction aside) the necessary
material to perhaps one day make an exact replica clone.207 Spinoff genealogy
sites, such as GEDmatch, do not accept and test DNA samples from their users,
instead allowing users to voluntarily upload (for free) the raw results of their
DNA testing from companies such as Ancestry and 23andMe.208
In addition to DNA samples, genealogy sites also collect other critical
personal data from users. For example, during registration GEDmatch gathers
the user’s “name, an optional alias, and email address.”209 Once registered, the
user provides the site other personal information such as “sex, Y-DNA or
mtDNA haplogroup, genetic sequence/information, Genealogy data, and/or Tier
1 payment information.”210 Further, users may “engage in forums that are
designed to be visible to other users, including comments and postings.”211
Ancestry and 23andMe have similar policies.212
Genealogy websites usually have policies to ensure that the uploaded
DNA samples and other sensitive private information are provided by the owner
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(or authorized user) of the data.213 GEDmatch manages this issue by requiring
those who upload their raw DNA data to make certain representations to the
website owners:214 that it is either their own DNA or else that they are authorized
to upload it.215 If a user does not have specific permission to reveal other
genealogy data, the user agrees “to privatize living individuals in your Genealogy
Data prior to providing it to GEDmatch” by “changing the names of living
individuals to ‘LIVING’ or something similar,” or else face the penalty of having
the user’s data deleted.216
The second area of inquiry in third-party doctrine scenarios is to
determine whether the person releasing the sensitive DNA data is a “third-party
participant” (and not a “mere intermediary”).217 Most genealogy sites have
privacy terms to inform their users about the privacy that protects their uploaded
sensitive data.218 For example, Ancestry explains it “does not share your
individual Personal Information (including your Genetic Information) with
third-parties without your additional consent . . . . [W]e will not share your
Genetic Information with insurance companies, employers, or third-party
marketers without your express consent.”219 GEDmatch states that “all
Genealogy Data provided to GEDmatch can be viewed, searched, and compared
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by any GEDmatch user,” but users can partly protect their privacy by “providing
an alias for either login or data.”220
Most genealogy websites also allow their users to choose the level of
privacy over their data. Even GEDmatch221—used extensively by law
enforcement before and after the Golden State Killer breakthrough—updated its
policies in May 2019 to increase the privacy rights of its customers. Under its
revised terms of service, GEDmatch allows users to designate their data
“private,” meaning it “is not available for comparisons with other people. It may
be usable in some utilities that do not depend on comparisons with other
DNA.”222 Data that a user designates as “public + opt-in” is “available for
comparison to any Raw Data in the GEDmatch database using the various tools
provided for that purpose.”223 Data that a user designates as “public + opt-out” is
available for comparison to any Raw Data in the GEDmatch
database, except DNA kits identified as being uploaded for Law
Enforcement purposes. Comparison results, including your kit
number, name (or alias), and email will be displayed for
“Public” kits that share DNA with the kit being used to make the
comparison, except that kits identified as being uploaded for
Law Enforcement purposes will only be matched with kits that
have “opted-in.”224
Finally, data designated “research” is “available for one-to-one comparison to
other Public or Research DNA. It is not shown in other people’s ‘one-to-many’
results lists. The Raw Data that you uploaded is not made available.”225
Also, recall from Part III that genealogy sites recognize that the DNA
samples, test results, and other private data uploaded to these sites generally are
the property of the user. For example, Ancestry users “always maintain
ownership of [their] data,”226 and GEDmatch affirms that “[r]aw DNA data
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uploaded to GEDmatch.Com (‘Raw Data’) remains the property of the person
who uploaded it.”227 With the fact of property ownership comes the right to
exclude others from the data. Thus, in addition to privacy settings, some
companies give the user control over what information is maintained on the
website. For instance, 23andMe gives its users the ability to share information
by choosing whether to “store or discard your saliva sample after it has been
analyzed”; which “health report(s) you view and/or opt-in to view”; “[w]hen and
with whom you share your information, including friends, family members,
health care professionals, or other individuals outside our Services, including
through third-party services that accept 23andMe data and social networks;” and
to “give or decline consent for 23andMe Research;” and to “delete your 23andMe
account and data, at any time.”228 And GEDmatch allows users to delete family
trees and other genealogy data simply by “clicking on the ‘Manage your
resources’ link on your home page.”229
2. Data-Sharing with Law Enforcement on Genealogy Websites
In the context of police searches of genealogy sites, one other category
of information is critical—the level of informed consent each genealogy site
provides its users about how their private information will (or will not) be shared
with law enforcement. This is particularly important to help determine whether
users waive any privacy objections by expressly authorizing the sharing of their
information with the police. If so, these would not be PAL Level 3 or 4 scenarios
but Level 5, where express consent has defeated any potential privacy rights
sought to be vindicated. Here, the private sites (i.e., Ancestry and 23andMe) have
taken a different approach than some of the publicly available websites (i.e.,
GEDmatch), with the private sites expressly resisting law enforcement
cooperation and GEDmatch being more cooperative.
Ancestry and 23andMe notify their users that they will fully resist law
enforcement within the bounds of the law. Ancestry’s published guidance for
law enforcement data requests contains the following information policies:
Ancestry will release basic subscriber information as defined in
18 USC § 2703(c)(2) about Ancestry users to law enforcement
only in response to a valid trial, grand jury or administrative
subpoena. Ancestry will release additional account information
or transactional information pertaining to an account (such as
search terms, but not including the contents of communications)
only in response to a court order issued pursuant to 18 USC §
227
228
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2703(d). Contents of communications and any data relating to
the DNA of an Ancestry user will be released only pursuant to a
valid search warrant from a government agency with proper
jurisdiction. If we receive a valid request under U.S. law to
preserve records that constitute potentially relevant evidence in
legal proceedings, we will preserve, but not disclose, a
temporary snapshot of the relevant account records for 90 days
pending service of valid legal process as described above.230
When records are demanded via a proper warrant, Ancestry will “notify
users of the request and provide a copy of the request prior to disclosure, unless
[it is] legally restricted from doing so” by a “court order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
2705(b) or equivalent state statute that is signed by a judge.”231 Significantly,
Ancestry also provides the possibility of releasing information to law
enforcement in “an exigent emergency that involves the danger of death or
serious physical injury to a person that Ancestry may have information necessary
to prevent,” if law enforcement sends an “emergency disclosure request”
including the identity of the person in danger; the “nature of the emergency
(e.g., report of suicide, bomb threat)”; the account holder’s “username and the
email and/or mailing address”; the “specific information requested and why that
information is necessary to prevent the emergency”; and all other “details or
context.”232 23andMe has similarly strict policies that seek to avoid cooperation
with law enforcement in most cases.233
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But requests of this type appear to be infrequent as of early 2019. For
instance, Ancestry reported to the Associated Press (AP) that it had not “received
such requests for genetic information in the last three years,” and 23andMe
informed the AP that it had “‘never given customer information to law
enforcement officials’” despite five requests from law enforcement about
Americans’ data.234 In 2018, Ancestry reported it had received ten law
enforcement requests for user information; it had “provided information in
response to 7 of those 10 requests”; all requests were related to “investigations
involving credit card misuse and identity theft”; it had “refused numerous
inquiries on the basis that the requestor failed to obtain the appropriate legal
process”; and it had “received no valid requests for information related to genetic
information of any Ancestry member, and we did not disclose any such
information to law enforcement.”235
In contrast, GEDmatch has made a conscious decision to cooperate with
law enforcement, but only in certain types of serious crime investigations. First,
the site warns its users that the sensitive private data they provide to GEDmatch
can be used for “[f]amilial searching by third parties such as law enforcement
agencies to identify the perpetrator of a crime, or to identify remains.”236 It also
informs users that it “may disclose your Raw Data, personal information, and/or
Genealogy Data if it is necessary to comply with a legal obligation such as a
subpoena or warrant. We will attempt to alert you to this disclosure of your Raw
Data, personal information, and/or Genealogy Data, unless notification is
prohibited under law.”237
After the Golden State Killer case became public, GEDmatch made a
policy decision to provide additional informed consent to its users to get their
permission to allow those types of intrusions by the government, and it tightened
the terms of that policy in May 2019. Its revised terms of service authorize
(police) users to load “DNA obtained and authorized by law enforcement to
identify a perpetrator of a violent crime against another individual, where
‘violent crime’ is defined as murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, aggravated
rape, robbery, or aggravated assault; [and] DNA obtained and authorized by law
enforcement to identify remains of a deceased individual”—although this data
will now only be compared to the data of those customers who expressly “opt-
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in” to such comparisons.238 This was the technique the police used in the Golden
State Killer case—creating a false profile with the unknown DNA evidence and
loading it up to GEDmatch in search of relatives and then creating a family tree.
3. Applying the Third-Party Doctrine after Carpenter
In light of the genealogy sites’ privacy policies and informed consent
regarding cooperation with (or resistance to) law enforcement, the final question
to consider is whether, after Carpenter, the third-party doctrine should be applied
to negate Fourth Amendment privacy interests possessed by individuals in their
own DNA and test results (i.e., PAL Levels 3 or 4). This section will address
each of those scenarios in turn.
Before diving in, consider the analysis prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Carpenter v. United States. Prior to that case, the typical third-party
analysis would have first noted that users have provided their own personal DNA
data “voluntarily” to a third party and that it is the actual “third-party
participants” (i.e., the genealogy companies) that are distributing the users’ DNA
data to the police.239 This would weigh in favor of applying the third-party
doctrine. Then, the analysis would have observed that users of genealogy sites
“assumed the risk” when they gave their sensitive private data to a third party,
taking the chance that the genealogy companies might “betray” them by giving
that private data to the police to search. For some, that might be the end of the
analysis because any “reasonable” expectation of privacy under Katz became
unreasonable once the user assumed the risk of entrusting their data to a third
party.
But it is worth pausing a moment to recognize that, even in a preCarpenter world, the Supreme Court had drawn a distinction between
“non-content” information (e.g., telephone numbers, addresses) and “content”
data (e.g., substance of phone conversations, content of letters).240 Indeed, Justice
Kennedy’s dissent in Carpenter—while defending the third-party doctrine on its
face—acknowledged that the doctrine had traditionally accepted limits: it “may
not apply when the Government obtains the modern-day equivalents of an
individual’s own ‘papers’ or ‘effects,’ even when those papers or effects are held
by a third party.”241 Of course, some “content” disclosures are traditionally
covered by the third-party doctrine, such as the bank papers in Miller. But that is
because those documents “were ‘negotiable instruments’ that were ‘to be used in
commercial transactions.’ The third-party doctrine thus recognizes two
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distinctions—one between content and non-content and one between personal
communications and business records.”242
With that caveat, one might have argued, even before Carpenter, that
giving up the content of one’s DNA test is more like the substance of a letter
(“content”) than mere addressing information (“non-content”). Also, a DNA test
result is not the kind of commercial “business record” held by a bank as part of
a negotiable-instruments framework, but more like a personal communication
(perhaps a biological diary). And, before Carpenter, the analysis likely would
have led to a discussion of Maryland v. King’s distinction that searching “junk
DNA” for mere identification information is more like recording telephone
numbers than the substance of a telephone call (assuming the police only use the
junk DNA for its identification purposes).243 More on that below.
Enter Carpenter. Recall that the Carpenter Court articulated two reasons
not to extend the third-party doctrine to the collection of CSLI: (1) the primary
rationale for the third-party doctrine (that only limited information can be
gleaned from data such as telephone numbers) did not apply due to the nature of
CSLI, which made it possible to track everyone’s location for years;244 and, (2)
the assumption-of-risk rationale did not apply because CSLI “is not truly ‘shared’
as one normally understands the term” due to the “indispensable” requirement to
carry a cell phone for “participation in modern society” and because cell phones
log location data “without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond
powering up,” thus defeating the notion the user “assumed the risk” in any
“meaningful sense.”245 Each of these rationales will be applied below in the DNA
context.
First, are DNA and test-result data more like CSLI or more like
telephone numbers and business records, the items to which the third-party
doctrine was intended to apply? For the reasons discussed in Parts II and III,
DNA information is more like CSLI, given its ability to store immense amounts
of intimate data. But this leads back to the Court’s analysis in King, which has
been accepted by lower courts as the proper distinction when the government
uses CODIS to search “junk DNA” (with no known coding functions) for the
sole purpose of identifying a person.246 Recall, however, that private genealogy
companies go beyond the purposes and techniques used in CODIS to merely
identify suspects. These services also look deep into heritage, health, and
research. Further, genealogy searches work differently than CODIS, as Ancestry
explained when discussing its “autosomal DNA test,” which surveys “a person’s
242
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entire genome at over 700,000 locations.”247 Thus, it seems fair to say—
assuming the police truly are seeking the contents of a DNA test result contained
on a genealogy site—that this presents a distinguishable situation from King. If
the police seek “content data” within DNA or in test results generated by a
genealogy company, then the first rationale for the third-party doctrine seems
inapplicable, as in Carpenter.
But one might still want to argue as in King that, even considering the
additional data in genealogy databases, the police are not interested in any of that
data and merely want to find a suspect’s relatives for identification purposes.
Thus, perhaps this search is exactly like King, even though it takes place outside
of CODIS. But even if it were true that the police did not seek this additional
data, the problem with that position is it minimizes King’s reliance on the search
occurring in the “junk” portion of DNA, and also that the government sincerely
could argue CODIS existed only for identification purposes. With private
databases, neither of those conditions is true. Searches used by private databases
go beyond junk DNA, and the databases themselves exist for many more
functions in addition to identification. King is entirely distinguishable.
The second inquiry asks whether the assumption-of-risk rationale
applies to DNA data, or whether that rationale falls away as it did in Carpenter
because CSLI was not “voluntarily” given. Here, the argument in favor of
applying the third-party doctrine is stronger than in Carpenter. Unlike CSLI,
there is nothing “indispensable” to modern society in giving one’s DNA data to
a genealogy company. One might argue that the genealogy boom has made it so
that everyone does and should want to know their heritage and the identity of
their biological relatives, but this still seems a far distance removed from the cellphone situation. (Perhaps one day the DNA issue will permeate as thoroughly as
cell phones, but that remains to be seen.)
Also, unlike with CSLI, users take several deliberate “affirmative acts”
before their private data is placed in the hands of a third party. This is not a
situation where one’s DNA is automatically uploaded to a database when one
“powers up,” as with CSLI. Indeed, based on the privacy policies described
earlier, users have full control over their data. Not only do they choose to spit in
a tube and mail it to 23andMe, they also choose to upload those results on
websites, to upload additional personal information, to make their data
searchable by other users, and to delete (or keep) their data on the website.
Everything about the process is deliberate, including the reading and
acknowledging of terms of service and privacy statements.
Thus, under the second rationale discussed in Carpenter, a much
stronger argument can be made that DNA users have “assumed the risk” that a
third party would betray them and open their data to a police search, regardless
of what the privacy policies say. Recall that those policies were premised on the
understanding that law enforcement could access DNA data with an
247
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administrative warrant of the type authorized by the Stored Communications
Act, which uses a standard less than Fourth Amendment probable cause. Unlike
CSLI data, the DNA data turned over to genealogy websites appears more suited
to the traditional assumption-of-risk analysis that is central to the third-party
doctrine.
Perhaps this analysis justifies applying the third-party doctrine in Level
3 scenarios, despite Ancestry and 23andMe’s insistence that they will not turn
over one’s data to the police. And surely this analysis justifies applying the
third-party doctrine in Level 4 scenarios, where companies such as GEDmatch
have openly stated they will share the information with law enforcement for
familial searching purposes and that they have authorized the police to load up
DNA samples on their site to help solve serious crimes. That is a classic
assumption-of-risk scenario.
But before concluding that the third-party doctrine will defeat whatever
potential Fourth Amendment privacy interest was recognized above in Part III,
one other item must be discussed. Recall that the third-party doctrine was
designed to deal with the modern Katz approach to “reasonable expectations of
privacy.” Would the doctrine similarly defeat a traditional property-based
approach, as Justice Gorsuch articulated in his dissent in Carpenter? Or is this a
situation where the property-rights approach provides greater privacy protections
than Katz?
In his dissent in Carpenter, Justice Gorsuch argued that
the fact that a third party has access to or possession of your
papers and effects does not necessarily eliminate your interest in
them. Ever hand a private document to a friend to be returned?
Toss your keys to a valet at a restaurant? Ask your neighbor to
look after your dog while you travel? You would not expect the
friend to share the document with others; the valet to lend your
car to his buddy; or the neighbor to put Fido up for adoption.
Entrusting your stuff to others is a bailment.248
He contended that a “bailee normally owes a legal duty to keep the item safe,
according to the terms of the parties’ contract if they have one, and according to
the ‘implication[s] from their conduct’ if they don’t.”249 He argued that a person
may not lose their Fourth Amendment interest in the contents of their data just
because they entrust it to a third party: “Whatever may be left of Smith and
248
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Miller, few doubt that e-mail should be treated much like the traditional mail it
has largely supplanted—as a bailment in which the owner retains a vital and
protected legal interest.”250
In the Level 3 scenario with Ancestry and 23andMe, considering the
types of contracts into which users enter (including the companies’
law-enforcement-resistant provisions), and in light of the very real property
interest that a person has in one’s own DNA and test results, it would seem
Justice Gorsuch’s property-based approach would permit Fourth Amendment
protection. Not only is a protected property interest at stake, but the owner of the
property has merely created a bailment with the genealogy companies to hold the
DNA data in trust for as long as the owner wishes to keep it with them. A trespass
on that data is still a trespass on a current property interest owned by the user,
and hence a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Still, a different result is
probably reached in the Level 4 scenario with GEDmatch, where the owner of
the data has expressly agreed by contract to open up their DNA data to search by
law enforcement (unless perhaps the police exceed the bounds of the licensed
search in the GEDmatch contract with the user). In that case, the owner has
licensed the search.
In sum, considering the Level 3 and 4 scenarios where the DNA owner
entrusts data to a third-party genealogy company, any expectation of privacy
recognized in a Katz analysis likely is extinguished by the third-party doctrine.
Although DNA data is immense, as with CSLI, the assumption-of-risk rationale
significantly undergirding that doctrine provides a valid basis to apply the
doctrine. But, under a traditional property-based approach, the third-party
doctrine likely would not defeat the protected property interests in a Level 3
scenario, although a search might still be proper in a Level 4 scenario due to
contract licensing terms. In either event, because Part III concluded one does not
have a protected Fourth Amendment interest in the DNA or test results of a
biological relative, nothing in that Amendment would prevent police from
searching the DNA results of a criminal subject’s biological relatives to find an
identity match.
V. FUTURE ALTERNATIVES TO PROTECT GENETIC PRIVACY AFTER
CARPENTER
This Article has identified areas where the Fourth Amendment does and
does not protect an individual’s DNA and test results submitted to private
genealogy websites. While, after Carpenter, there is a plausible chance the U.S.
Constitution will sometimes prevent law enforcement from searching those

Id. at 2269. Gorsuch also doubted that “complete ownership or exclusive control of property
is always a necessary condition” under the Fourth Amendment because, “[w]here houses are
concerned, for example, individuals can enjoy Fourth Amendment protection without fee simple
title. Both the text of the Amendment and the common law rule support that conclusion.” Id.
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databases without probable cause, it is likely that any protection would not
extend beyond an individual’s right to protect their own test results from
unlawful search. So what protections exist to regulate police familial searches of
the DNA results of biological relatives? In Part V, this Article briefly comments
on the current state of the law and the need for further protections. It then offers
some preliminary thoughts to be pursued in future articles on potential legislative
solutions to protect individual privacy in this area.
A. The Need for Protection
The lightning-paced evolution of DNA technology has led to greater and
sooner advances in DNA research than previously expected. Even as NDIS and
other law enforcement DNA databases expand, advances in technology make
future DNA testing cheaper and more accessible. The advent of “touch DNA”
now allows law enforcement to “obtain full forensic DNA profiles from
exceedingly small amounts of biological material” such as “skin cells shed when
touching objects” like “the handle of a gun, the portion of a torn screen touched
by an intruder, a brick used to break a window in a burglary, or the steering wheel
of a stolen vehicle.”251 The use of Rapid DNA analysis has also opened the
possibility for local DNA processing without resort to crime labs.252
And the capability to exploit these DNA databases is growing daily.
Researchers in October 2018 concluded that police could use private genealogy
databases to identify crime suspects with increasing accuracy, and that “about
60% of the searches for individuals of European-descent will result in a third
cousin or closer match[.]”253 In a different study released the same month,
researchers concluded that an individual’s DNA (or the DNA of a relative)
contained in certain genealogy databases could be identified by linking that data
“to a CODIS profile, and vice versa, in a manner not intended in the context of
either database examined in isolation,” which “could expose relatives of the
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participant to forensic investigation; moreover, phenotypes of a relative could
potentially be identifiable from a forensic profile.”254
As these capabilities grow, the potential for indiscriminate and
unchecked police use of private DNA databases to identify criminals should be
a concern for those who care about privacy. As Justice Scalia warned in King,
the government could solve more crimes by taking DNA from “anyone who flies
on an airplane . . . , applies for a driver’s license, or attends a public school.
Perhaps the construction of such a genetic panopticon is wise. But I doubt [our
Founders] would have been so eager to open their mouths for royal
inspection.”255 Yet that is exactly what millions of Americans have done
voluntarily—opened their mouths for inspection and for cataloguing in a private
database, perhaps unaware that the government could exploit that act for solving
crime.
Some scholars have argued that police DNA searches, especially familial
searches, “should be forbidden because they embody the very presumptions that
our constitutional and evidentiary rules have long endeavored to counteract: guilt
by association, racial discrimination, propensity, and even biological
determinism.”256 They worry about the impact of these searches on innocent
relatives of suspects, on unfairly targeted racial minorities,257 and on those whose
privacy will be invaded by the inevitable inaccuracies in testing DNA samples
recovered from a crime scene.258 As this Article noted in its introduction, even
the Golden State Killer investigation first swabbed two false leads before finding
a true match. What impact does that have on the life of the person who has fallen
under a cloud of suspicion for some period of time?
Legislatures have taken some action in the past decade to deal with
issues related to DNA testing and research. And though some states have passed
laws that “prohibit genetic discrimination by health insurers and employers,”
those laws often include exceptions for law enforcement purposes, and none
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provide protections regarding familial searching.259 Following the lead of
scholars and scientists, some legislatures have considered bills modeled on the
Genetic Privacy Act proposed by a group of bioethicists,260 and state and federal
governments have started to provide protection in the employment
discrimination context.261 But none of those laws address the privacy concerns
raised by law enforcement searches of genealogy databases.262
Nor do current privacy-based laws—such as wiretapping statutes, the
Stored Communications Act, or HIPAA—provide answers to this problem.
Professor Natalie Ram summarizes the current lack of regulation in this area:
In other contexts, Congress has acted to create statutory
protections, so we have the Stored Communications Act, which
gives certain privacy protections for your emails. But we don’t
have any sort of analogous law for ordinary genetic data like the
genealogical data at issue in the Golden State Killer
investigation. We do have protections in some other settings: so
your identifiable health information might be protected under
the HIPAA Privacy Rule, and certain kinds of data used for
research purposes can be eligible for other kinds of protections.
But generally speaking, your genetic information in a
commercial, direct-to-consumer website setting, there isn’t a lot
of legal protection that’s obviously available.263
More must be done.
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B. Potential Legislative Considerations
In Parts III and IV, this Article provided an argument in support of some
Fourth Amendment protections for suspects with regard to law enforcement
access to their DNA test results, even those held by third-party genealogy
companies and found on publicly accessible websites. But while there may be an
argument in favor of that protection, there is little chance the Fourth amendment
protects a criminal subject from the police search of DNA data belonging to that
subject’s biological relatives. Yet there are compelling reasons for Congress and
state legislatures to act to curb the potential for unfettered police practices. And,
as with so many other policy issues, it should not be the role of the courts to make
policy and constitutionalize the area of DNA testing when state and federal
legislators are more than capable of addressing the problem.
In United States v. Jones, Justice Alito commented on the need and
desirability for legislative intervention to provide democratic protections against
police overreach in the digital age. Noting the “concern about new intrusions on
privacy,” Justice Alito expressed the hope this might “spur the enactment of
legislation to protect against these intrusions.”264 He compared the situation to
that of wiretapping after Katz, where “Congress did not leave it to the courts to
develop a body of Fourth Amendment case law governing that complex subject.
Instead, Congress promptly enacted a comprehensive statute . . . and since that
time, the regulation of wiretapping has been governed primarily by statute and
not by case law.”265 His comments echoed the Court’s thoughts a few years
earlier, in District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne,266
where it refused to apply the Due Process Clause to create a new substantive
right of a convicted person to access a state’s DNA evidence, explaining:
DNA evidence will undoubtedly lead to changes in the criminal
justice system. It has done so already. The question is whether
further change will primarily be made by legislative revision and
judicial interpretation of the existing system, or whether the
Federal Judiciary must leap ahead—revising (or even
discarding) the system by creating a new constitutional right and
taking over responsibility for refining it.267
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Professor Murphy, in proposing a three-fold goal of closely regulating
familial searches (i.e., “to minimize their intrusiveness, optimize their efficacy,
and ensure their legality”), has recommended regulations over when such
searches could occur, the technical parameters delimiting the scope of the
searches, the databases subject to search, regulations following a potential
familial match, and creation of structural oversight of the process.268 And
Professor Jessica Gabel has proposed language for a statute involving familial
DNA searching.269
In the future, these and other proposals should be built upon to develop
legislation that could provide a balanced approach to preserving privacy rights
while not handicapping legitimate law enforcement efforts in this area.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment has evolved with the times, especially as new
and unexpected technologies have revolutionized both crime and law
enforcement techniques. This Article has explored the issue of warrantless police
searches of private genealogy databases after Carpenter v. United States,
focusing on whether the Fourth Amendment protects DNA test results—both a
person’s own results and those of their biological relatives—and whether the
third-party doctrine is viable in that context. It traced the roots of the Supreme
Court’s property-based and modern Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy”
approaches to the Fourth Amendment and described the development of the
third-party doctrine. Examining the Carpenter decision, it analyzed the Court’s
modified approach—including its new multifactor balancing test—and the two
rationales it employed in limiting the third-party doctrine with regard to cell-site
location information (CSLI).
Then, in light of Carpenter—and using both the traditional
property-based and modern Katz approaches—it analyzed whether the Fourth
Amendment would protect a criminal subject’s DNA data from the police search
of a private genealogy database. It concluded that a plausible argument supports
such protection under both approaches. But it also found a strong basis to reject
any Fourth Amendment claim of a criminal subject in the DNA data of a
biological relative. Next, exploring the third-party doctrine, it found that doctrine
likely to defeat a claim of privacy under the Katz approach because the

handling DNA. Establishing a freestanding right to access DNA evidence for
testing would force us to act as policymakers, and our substantive-due-process
rulemaking authority would not only have to cover the right of access but a
myriad of other issues. We would soon have to decide if there is a
constitutional obligation to preserve forensic evidence that might later be
tested. . . . No doubt there would be a miscellany of other minor directives.
Id. at 73–74 (citations omitted).
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assumption-of-risk rationale would apply. Yet the property-based approach
discussed by Justice Neil Gorsuch in his Carpenter dissent might still offer
protection under a bailment theory, despite the involvement of a third party.
Finally, it briefly set forth the need for legislative action to prevent unfettered
police action in this area, and suggested areas for future research.
With technology continuing to advance—and the genealogy boom
driving millions of consumers to entrust to third parties their DNA and all of its
intimate biological secrets—the Fourth Amendment should place some limits on
police action in this area. The Court’s traditional property-based approach to that
Amendment provides the best avenue for those limits. And where the Fourth
Amendment’s protection ends, legislative action should begin in order to avoid
continued invasions of privacy into one of the most sensitive storehouses of
intimate data: the human genome itself.

